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A REPORT

TO THE

ALBERT KAHN TRUSTEES ON THE RESULTS
OF A JOURNEY ROUND THE WORLD,
JULY 21, 1913, TO JULY 24, 1914

BY

DOUGLAS KNOOP

Lecturer on Economics in the University of Sheffield

October, 1914

LONDON : UNIVERSITY OF LONDON PRESS
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COLOUR IMPRESSIONS

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COLOUR IMPRESSIONS*

Under the general heading of "Colour Impressions" I propose to discuss briefly some aspects of the relationship of white races to coloured races. As I conceive the situation, it is not a single colour problem that has to be considered, but a series of more or less intimately related colour problems. Roughly, I should divide them into two groups: one set of problems is concerned with the relationship of a white to a coloured race in the latter's native country, the other set refers to the relationship of a white to a coloured race in a country which is foreign to the latter.

Amongst the former group of problems we have:—

(a) the relationship of ruling to subject races, as in India, Ceylon, and Java;

(b) the relationship of a white people to the inhabitants of a country which it has temporarily occupied, as, for example, the English in Egypt and the Americans in the Philippines;

* This report is based primarily on information I gathered during the course of my travels, and I am much indebted to numerous gentlemen for the hospitality and kind assistance they gave me. I have, naturally, also made some use of information obtained from books relating to the various countries I visited. Amongst these books I may mention Lord Cromer's *Modern Egypt*, J. Chailley's *Administrative Problems of British India*, A. Cabaton's *Java and the Dutch East Indies*, H. B. Morse's *Trade and Administration of China*, and J. H. Longford's *Japan and the Japanese*. The few statistics I quote are from the *Statements Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress of India*, 1910-11 and 1912-13, and from the *Annual Report of the Japanese Department of Education*, 1910-11.

My best thanks are due to Dr. J. D. Jones for reading through this report, both in MS. and in proof, and to Mr. T. S. Ashton, Mr. E. Deller and Mr. C. R. Young for reading it through in proof.

(c) the relationship of white races to an independent coloured race which is treated as inferior, as, for example, the Chinese;

(d) the relationship of white races to an independent coloured race which is treated as equal, as, for example, the Japanese; and

(e) the relationship of a white to a coloured race in a country which is native to both races, as, for example, the United States, with its white and its negro population.

The latter group of problems appears to fall into two classes :—

(a) those concerned with the reception and treatment of coloured immigrants in a predominantly white country, as is the case in the United States, Canada, Australia, and South Africa;

(b) those concerned with the reception and treatment of coloured immigrants in a predominantly coloured country, as in Ceylon and the Straits Settlements on the one hand, and the Philippine Islands, Hawaii, and Java on the other.

There is at least one colour problem which falls outside my scheme of classification, namely, the relationship of white people to half-castes.

In the course of my journey round the world I have come into contact, to some extent at least, with all these various colour problems, but I make no claim to have made a special study of any of them, as that, I believed, was contrary to the terms of my Fellowship, in which it is stated that the Fellow is not to conduct any definite piece of investigation or research. I availed myself of the opportunities presented to me to observe and learn

what I could about colour problems, but it is not without hesitation that I am stating my impressions on some of these rather debatable subjects.

I.

Where Great Britain rules a country with a coloured population, such as India or Ceylon, its object is to govern the dependency or colony in the best interests of the native inhabitants, or, in other words, it seeks to secure the political, economic, and moral welfare of the subject races. The political welfare consists in the protection of life and property and the administration of justice. During recent years British rule in India has not reached as high a standard in this respect as could be wished. Outrages on life and property have been much too common in certain parts of the country, and in very many cases the Government has failed to secure the conviction of the offenders. Often it is known who the offenders are, and yet their guilt cannot be brought home to them. Where such a state of affairs exists—and its existence in India is, I think, universally admitted—something is wrong with the administration of justice. The fault appears to lie in the attempt to give India a system of judicial administration too closely based upon the English model, without making sufficient allowance for the great differences in the conditions prevailing in England and India. Owing to intimidation of witnesses, bribery, and the wholesale committing of perjury, it is often impossible in India to prove a man guilty according to the strict law of evidence. The native has no sense of honour or truth; at no stage of his life is he

taught such things. Moreover, the working of his mind is often incomprehensible to an Occidental. It is not uncommon for a man to murder a father or other near relative so that he may throw suspicion of the crime on his enemy. The bringing of false or fictitious charges is so common in India that it is dealt with in the penal code as a crime, whereas in England malicious prosecution is a civil offence.

As far as civil cases are concerned, the introduction of English legal procedure into India affords facilities for delays and encourages litigation of which the natives are altogether too fond.

What appears to be wanted in India is a much more summary system of jurisdiction, freed from some of the safeguards and technicalities which are theoretically intended to protect innocent persons, but which in practice permit a great many guilty persons to escape punishment. Such a system might work hardly on a certain number of innocent persons, but taking the situation as a whole it appears that a greater measure of justice would be secured. It is also probable that under such a system it would be more difficult to secure the conviction of innocent persons on fictitious charges. The present system of administering justice appears to many to encourage discontented persons to commit outrages, as the chances are very much against the guilt being brought home to the offender. Further consideration of this point, however, may be deferred until we come to consider the general question of Indian unrest.

The efforts made by the British rulers in India to enhance the material welfare of the people call for unbounded admiration. Great progress has been made in the matter of providing transit facilities; the enormous

expenditure on trunk roads, railways, and harbour works has opened up the country and rendered it accessible to shipping.

In many districts irrigation schemes have been carried through, which have largely increased the productive capacity of the country. Generally speaking, the inhabitants have welcomed transportation and irrigation schemes, as they realise the advantages which they derive from them. But when it comes to sanitary improvements, these have often to be introduced and carried on in the face of much apathy, if not active opposition, on the part of the natives. Contaminated water from a well is nearly always preferred to pure water supplied through mains. The precautions taken in well-built municipal tenements to prevent overcrowding and to secure through ventilation are frequently unavailing: too many people occupy a tenement, and the openings are largely barricaded with old bits of cloth and rags. It is often difficult, if not impossible, to make the native comply with regulations drawn up with the object of stamping out the deadly malaria-bearing mosquito. Similarly there is much opposition to the measures taken to fight plague. In spite of the difficulties with which they have to contend, the authorities have achieved a great deal in the direction of improving sanitary conditions. I was particularly struck by the work done by the Bombay Improvement Trust. They have made wide new streets through congested areas, they have bought and pulled down insanitary dwellings and have erected blocks of model dwellings in their place; they have drawn up and begun to carry out a large scheme of town-planning in the north of the Bombay Island, which will prevent congestion in new quarters of the town.

Another way in which the Government looks after the material interests of the people is by accumulating relief funds for distribution and for the provision of work in any district in which the failure of a crop is threatening the population with famine.

The British rulers of India are frequently accused of being apathetic to the moral welfare of the population. The policy of the Government has always been to offend the religious susceptibilities of the people as little as possible, so as to avoid arousing the religious passions of the vast Hindu and Mohammedan population, as this could not fail to render the task of governing the country exceedingly difficult. In a few cases the authorities have interfered, as, for example, to forbid the ancient Hindu practice of burning of widows, and to discourage child marriages, but on the whole they have been scrupulously careful not to interfere in religious matters. The education provided in Government schools and colleges is non-sectarian, but, on the other hand, mission schools and colleges can earn Government grants. The immensity of the population on the one hand, and the very restricted financial resources available on the other, render it impossible to provide schooling for more than a very limited proportion of the total number of children, but the authorities are doing what they can to extend educational facilities.

The financial difficulties to be overcome, however, are very great, and a recent action of the home authorities has not made the task of the Government of India and of certain Colonial Governments any easier. I refer to the Opium Convention of 1907, by which the production of opium in India is being steadily curtailed for ten years until 1917, after which it is practically to cease. Under

an agreement signed in 1911 the cessation of the trade in opium will be accelerated if the native production of opium in China is suppressed before the expiry of the ten years' period. At the beginning of 1913 a further step was taken and the export of opium to China was discontinued. The Indian Government in the past has derived a large revenue from the sale of opium. The average net opium revenue during the three years prior to the coming into force of the convention was £3,800,000 per annum. The immediate effect of curtailing the supply was considerably to increase the revenue,* as the price of opium rose greatly,† but already the revenue has begun to fall, and the authorities will find it difficult to replace it.

The British Government entered into the Opium Convention with the object of assisting the Government of China to stamp out the consumption of opium amongst the Chinese. It may be said, therefore, to have acted in the interests of the moral welfare of the Chinese; but any credit it deserves for this moral act is seriously diminished, if not entirely eliminated, by the fact that the cost of the reform is being thrown upon the people

| | | | | | Net Opium Revenue. |
|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|--------------------------------------|
| * 1907-8 | ... | ... | ... | ... | £3,576,000 |
| 1908-9 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 4,649,000 |
| 1909-10 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 4,425,000 |
| 1910-11 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 6,275,000 |
| 1911-12 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 5,231,826 |
| 1912-13 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 4,524,863 |
| | | | | | Average price per chest of opium. |
| † 1907-8 | ... | ... | ... | ... | R. 1350 |
| 1908-9 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1384 |
| 1909-10 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1612 |
| 1910-11 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 2892 |
| 1911-12 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 2790 |
| 1912-13 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 2784 |

of India. It may be contended that it does not matter whether the Government of India raises its revenue by one tax or another, the people of India will ultimately have to pay. This, however, is not necessarily the case. It is almost certain that the revenue obtained by the Government of India from the sale of opium, in the production of which it enjoyed a considerable monopoly, was secured at the expense of the Chinese consumers, whose demand for the drug was extraordinarily great. The burden was shifted on to the foreign consumers in this case owing to the peculiar conditions, but the Government will hardly succeed in raising new revenue in the same manner.

A few more words with regard to the Opium Convention. Poppies were formerly extensively cultivated in China, but their cultivation there was to be restricted simultaneously with the restriction in India. How far this part of the agreement has been kept it is difficult to say; British Consular officials from time to time make tours of inspection, but they are only able to visit very little of the cultivated land. Every restriction in the importation of opium makes it more and more lucrative to produce it; and one cannot help wondering whether there are many Chinese officials, entrusted with the suppression of poppy cultivation, who can resist the temptation of the very large bribes which cultivators of poppies can now afford to pay to be freed from the attentions of the officials. As far as suppressing opium smoking is concerned, the Chinese authorities are pretty drastic, in some cases at least. Shortly before my arrival in Canton four Chinamen caught smoking opium paid for their offence with their heads!

There is another aspect to the Opium Convention.

As opium smoking diminishes, the use of morphia and cocaine for injection purposes is increasing rapidly amongst the Chinese. The importation of these substances is forbidden, but as they are small in bulk they are frequently smuggled, it being very generally said that the morphia and cocaine are brought out to the East on German boats from Germany, where these substances are prepared. Another substitute for opium is cheap spirits. For a peaceful and, perhaps, somewhat dreamy, opium-smoking Chinaman, there is substituted a rather violent and disorderly Oriental, a great deal more difficult to handle and much more objectionable as far as the people he comes in contact with are concerned. The Europeans in Singapore, for example, where Chinese form the vast bulk of the population, are by no means pleased with the change brought about by the restricted sale of opium and the increased sale of spirits.

British Government in India is paternal in character. To a large extent the natives are treated as children incapable of working out their own salvation. At the same time, the Government, by means of education, is seeking to make the people more capable of governing themselves. Nearly all the inferior, and a few of the superior, positions in the Government service are occupied by natives. In matters of local government the natives are often in almost complete control of their own destinies.

A certain section of the native population is not satisfied with British rule in India; these natives desire either a larger share in the government, or even complete control of it. The Government is constantly face to face with unrest, and it is necessary to consider whether the policy

it has adopted towards the native population is justifiable. As has already been stated, the desire of the authorities in India is to govern the country in the best interests of the many peoples who occupy the vast territory known as British India. Is there some other way in which these interests could be better advanced?

India is occupied by people of many races and several religions. Some of the races are more warlike than others, and Indian history is full of accounts of invasions and wars and of the subjugation of the less warlike races. Some of these wars have been for the sake of spoil or conquest alone, others have been undertaken in the name of religion. This is one point to bear in mind. Another is that it is only a very small proportion of the population which can make any pretension to be fit to conduct the government of the country. It is doubtful, however, whether even these few are fit to rule the country efficiently, except in their own estimation.

Almost every European in India who has had to do with teaching natives in schools or colleges agrees that whereas natives are frequently extraordinarily good at learning by heart, they rarely think for themselves. One case described to me in illustration of this fact particularly struck me, and I will mention it. A year or two ago some three hundred schoolboys were sitting for a university matriculation examination, writing an essay on the subject of "The Weather." It so happened that it was pouring with rain at the time, that the roof leaked badly, and that most of the boys had to sit with their umbrellas up to protect themselves. To sit like this in an examination-hall whilst writing an essay on the weather is rather an unusual circumstance, yet not one boy out of the three hundred mentioned it in his essay.

English officials in India are equally agreed that whereas natives make good subordinates and carry out their instructions under proper supervision, they are very helpless if any circumstance arises which is not provided for in the regulations.

No one who has not travelled in the East can have any conception of the extent to which bribery and corruption exist in Oriental lands. In some parts it is called "backsheesh," in other parts "squeeze," but under one name or another it prevails everywhere in the East. The desire to benefit himself to some extent in connection with every transaction he handles seems ingrained in the native. He sees absolutely nothing wrong in it. It is practised from the lowest ranks of society to the highest. The native servant charges his small commission on every purchase he makes on behalf of his master. If he spends eight annas in purchasing fruit, he will charge his master eight annas two pice or nine annas; if he orders something from a shop with which his master has an account, when that account is paid he receives a commission from the shopkeeper. The employer knows that he is being "squeezed," but he is obliged to put up with it, provided the "squeeze" does not become excessive. Occasionally when a young bride comes out to the East she is horrified at the way in which her husband is being overcharged by his servants. She decides she will do her own marketing. The bills, far from going down, will go up, as she is quite unskilled in the art of Oriental bargaining and cannot obtain as good terms as the native cook did. The servants will very likely refuse to stay and discomfort will probably result; and the cook, whether it be the old one or a new one, will still obtain a "squeeze," as the dealers from whom his

mistress buys will pay a commission to him just as the shopkeeper with whom his employer has an account. There is no escaping from "backsheesh," as no native regards it as wrong, but on the contrary, resents any attempt to suppress it as interference with the liberty of the subject. In this respect native Christians do not differ from Hindus or Mahommedans. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that native Christians are not popular with Europeans as servants, because, in addition to the vices possessed by Hindus and Mohommedans, they may be addicted to alcohol, which no Hindu or Mahomedan may touch by the laws of his religion.

In the higher walks of native life "backsheesh" is equally common as in the lower. The recent investigations into the failure of "Swadeshi," *i.e.*, natively-owned and managed, banks, showed that a director would accept a commission to make a loan from his bank on what he knew, or should have known, was bad security. A dealer in automobiles told me that he sold three powerful cars to a native prince. To secure payment he had to undertake to pay a 10 per cent. commission to a high functionary of the prince's court. The money, however, was not forthcoming, although he made numerous efforts to obtain it. Finally, he offered to raise the commission somewhat, and very shortly afterwards he was in receipt of the desired cheque. I may mention one more case of bribery to which my attention was drawn. Some years ago a native wanted to erect a building in a large Indian town, contrary to the building regulations. His plans were rejected and had to be considerably modified. Just recently he started making alterations in his building in accordance with his original proposals. The authorities objected. He produced his copy of plans,

which apparently authorised the building operations he was undertaking. The authorities referred to the original of the plans filed away in their office, and discovered that these corresponded with the owner's plans. Both the original and the copy had been "doctored," and it was evident that considerable bribery must have been employed to secure the abstraction of the plan from the official files to enable the doctoring to be done, and afterwards to secure its return.

These illustrations are merely typical of the sort of thing that exists on a very large scale in India and the East generally. The native thinks that everybody is as open to bribery as himself, and not infrequently presents of a very substantial character are sent to English officials or their wives, and the fact that they are invariably returned does not appear to discourage the native from repeating the attempt to bribe officials. Even now in Government offices, though the Sahibs are incorruptible, the native staff will get some pickings in the way of backsheesh. For example, whenever a native wishes to see one of the Sahibs he will give backsheesh to the personal orderly, various "peons," doorkeepers, etc.

The authorities find it impossible to prevent bribery and corruption, but they take what precautions they can to prevent the misuse of Government funds by placing Englishmen in charge wherever large sums are to be handled. The creation of Improvement Trusts in Bombay and Calcutta to do work which would ordinarily be entrusted to the municipal authorities is probably a case in point.

I am not considering here whether the acceptance and payment of bribes is right or wrong, nor am I suggesting for a moment that the Orient is the only part of the

world where such practices exist, but what I do assert is that "backsheesh" and "squeeze" are practically universal in the East, whenever opportunities occur, and that these practices are detrimental to good government.

Let us return to the question put before : Is there any way in which the interests of the peoples of India could be better promoted than by British rule in its present form? If we are convinced that no native administration could enforce peace upon some of the warlike races within or immediately without the frontiers or prevent religious persecutions; if we feel assured that native rule would mean the exploitation of the many in the interests of the few; if we believe that the great material benefits in the matter of transit facilities and so forth, secured by an enormous expenditure of capital and labour, would very shortly be allowed to go to rack and ruin; if we are of the opinion that the country would be in a state of chaos almost immediately after the withdrawal of the British troops and officials from India, we need have no hesitation in replying in the negative to the question asked above. Once we accept the proposition that for some indefinite period it is in the best interests of the peoples of India that the British should continue to rule there, then the present method of dealing with Indian unrest appears to be mistaken. The basis of the unrest is largely economic; a number of natives, very small in proportion to the total population, but not inconsiderable from an absolute point of view, are being educated to a point at which they consider most occupations beneath their dignity. They nearly all wish to become Government officials; most of them would be satisfied with quite small

posts, thanks to the dignity attaching to Government service; but it is obvious that positions in the civil service cannot be found for all youths who have passed through a secondary school or a university, unless very serious restrictions are imposed upon the number of natives allowed to enjoy the advantages of higher education. The number of English officials in India is very small compared to the number of Indian graduates turned out of the universities in any one year,* so that the number of posts available, even if all British officials were removed, would be quite inadequate to satisfy the demand for government employment. It is obvious that the bulk of the natives who have received a higher education will have to learn not to look to Government for employment. In the meanwhile, nearly all the political agitators come from their ranks. It does not appear probable that it will be feasible to satisfy their aspirations at any time; therefore, many people ask, why pander to them and encourage more and more of the better-educated youth of India to become seditionists? Kindness is easily mistaken for weakness by Orientals, and it is quite certain that the failure to put down dacoity and political outrages of all kinds, is generally accepted as an admission on the part of the Government that it is unable to put them down.

The present attitude of the authorities in India towards sedition and dacoity is, presumably, being carried out in accordance with directions issued by the home authorities, who seem to be imbued with high ideals about how India should be governed, without any great consideration for the safety of officials, British or native, high or

* About 5,000 students graduate from Calcutta University every year, and the other Universities are also turning out thousands of graduates.

low, in India. Newcomers to India, and ministers and members of Parliament at home, often appear very reluctant to take strong measures in India, either on principle or because they refuse to realise, or are unable to realise, the conditions prevailing in that country. When Lord Hardinge went out to India he insisted, either on his own initiative or at the suggestion of the authorities at home, on the precautions ordinarily taken for the protection of a Viceroy being greatly relaxed. This was done in direct opposition to the advice of British officials in India, who were in much the best position to understand local conditions, and in spite of the fact that various attempts had been made on the lives of governors and lieutenant-governors. Not very long afterwards the outrage was committed in Delhi which nearly cost Lord Hardinge his life; now when he appears in public extraordinary precautions are taken to secure his safety. On the occasion of his recent visit to Calcutta, the first since the capital was removed from that town to Delhi, the streets were lined with troops three deep, two rows facing the procession and one row with its back to the procession, facing the public. The Viceroy is absolutely right in taking every precaution for the protection of his person; where a mistake appears to be made is that much stronger measures are not taken to suppress political outrages of all kinds. Giving protection to threatened persons is merely a palliative which does not strike at the root of the evil. More than one efficient native police officer connected with the prosecution of some political crime has been murdered, in spite of his being covered by detectives.

If once it is decided that Britain is to continue to rule India for some indefinite period, it is

only common sense, it is mere fairness to British and native officials in India, to take adequate measures to secure safety of life and property in India. Cases of dacoity are constantly occurring in Bengal. Bands of ten, twelve, or more young men arrive at the village in which the house they wish to rob is situated. They first let off some firearms to announce their arrival and frighten away villagers, then, masked, they push their way into the selected house, whose scared inhabitants offer no resistance. They ascertain, by torture if necessary, where any silver, gold, or ornaments are hidden, and then decamp with the treasure. Much of this dacoity is political, to provide funds for political movements. To ensure enthusiasm amongst the younger generation, religion is often mixed up with the politics, and a doctrine of "self-sacrifice" is preached, which in practice is misapplied and distorted in the interests of the seditionists. Even where dacoits and assassins are caught it is rare that a conviction can be secured against them owing to the character of the legal procedure. Seditionists can commit outrages with very little fear of being punished.

There is a great danger of people at home attempting to decide on abstract general principles how a great coloured dependency like India should be administered, without making adequate allowance for the utterly different conditions which prevail in England and India. Officials on the spot are much better able to judge what is required in India than ministers and legislators at home, who are, in many cases, ignorant of even the most elementary facts concerning India; and, consequently, the recent tendency to strengthen the control of the Indian Office over the Government of India appears to

many to be a matter of regret. The tendency in India, too, to diminish the powers of the local officials and to concentrate these powers in the hands of the provincial governments, is another step in the direction of ignoring local conditions, which vary so enormously from one part of India to another.

In a country like India a much more autocratic form of Government is required than in a European country, and it is often necessary in the interests of good government to give powers to officials to an extent which at home would be regarded as most undesirable. Officials may commit acts which appear to be very high-handed, but prompt and summary action by a man on the spot, well-acquainted with local conditions, is likely to achieve much better results than slow and lengthy proceedings conducted in accordance with the requirements of the present law. From a theoretical point of view it would doubtless be a retrograde step to simplify the present legal procedure with its facilities for lodging appeals and its loopholes that provide opportunities for offenders to escape punishment, in favour of strengthening the hands of administrative officers; yet if that is the only means of obtaining an adequate measure of security for life and property, and of guaranteeing an orderly government of the country, the authorities should not hesitate to take the necessary steps, even though it might conflict with their ideals. A practical system to secure justice, even if a little rough-and-ready, is much to be preferred to a system which may be theoretically perfect, but which fails lamentably to protect life and property, because it is not adapted to the conditions prevailing in the country.

As has already been stated, the policy of the British in India is to govern the country in the best interests of the native races. This, however, is not the only attitude which a colonial power may adopt towards one of its possessions. It may feel that, having conquered a country, it is entitled to remain there and exploit it. In other words, the coloured population of a country may be governed, not in their own interests, but in the interests of the ruling race. This was the policy formerly adopted by the Dutch in Java. The natives were kept in a state of semi-slavery, and made to work on the Government estates. They were given no education, and little or no effort was made to enhance their material welfare. The object of the administration was to obtain for the mother-country as large a revenue as possible from the island.

The system which produced such large profits for Holland was that of "compulsory crops." Van den Bosch, when Governor-General, took from each cultivator one-fifth part of his land, on the understanding—which was not carried out—that the land tax should be abolished. The land thus seized was cultivated by means of the *corvée*, or compulsory labour, with sugar, coffee, pepper, tea, etc., for the benefit of the Government. Whether the *corvée* left the natives time to cultivate their own rice lands properly appeared to be a matter of indifference to the Government. Gradually public opinion in Holland was aroused at the way in which the natives of Java were being exploited. Finally, legislation was enacted to do away with the system of "compulsory crops." The first compulsory crop was abolished early in the seventies, and by 1890 the last had disappeared. The number of days which natives were

liable to work in the *corvée* was reduced, and the use of the *corvée* was restricted to works of public utility; by payment of a small tax natives could free themselves entirely from liability to work in the *corvée*.

In addition to abolishing "compulsory crops" and modifying the *corvée*, the Dutch authorities have introduced various other reforms, in particular a considerable extension of the educational system. At first the old prejudice against allowing natives to receive instruction in Dutch continued, but in recent years this has been considerably modified. The knowledge of Dutch and of Western learning amongst the natives is spreading; but Malay is, and is likely to continue to be, the *lingua franca* of the Dutch Indies. Its use is even more widespread than that of Hindustani in Northern India.

II.

So far we have considered the attitude of white races towards the coloured populations of dependencies and colonial possessions. Of recent years a new type of relationship has been established between certain white and certain coloured countries, under which the latter are neither colonies nor protectorates, but are merely "occupied" by the white power. The "occupation" of Egypt by the British, and the "occupation" of the Philippines by the Americans, are examples of this type of relationship; but, except that in both cases the white power concerned has expressed the intention of quitting the occupied territory when the natives are considered fit to govern themselves, there is little or no similarity between the position of the British in Egypt and the Americans in the Philippines. The

latter, except in name, are practically an American colony, administered by a Governor and numerous officials sent over from the United States; the former is certainly not a British colony, though it is difficult to say exactly what it is.

The British occupation of Egypt is due primarily to what the Americans describe as "dollar diplomacy." Financial chaos reigned in Egypt around 1880, and citizens of France and Great Britain were the principal creditors of the Egyptian Government. The French Ministry urged a dual occupation of the country, which the British Ministry were unwilling to assent to. Finally, however, a revolution broke out in Egypt, the lives and property of foreigners were in danger, and the British Government, much against their will, felt obliged to intervene. Just previous to this there had been a change in the French Ministry, and the new Ministry refused to co-operate with the British at the critical moment. The Italians were then invited to join in the expedition, but they also refused. So the British, acting alone, undertook to set things straight in Egypt. Alexandria was bombarded in July, 1882; the battle of Tel-el-Kebir was fought in September of the same year; and the rebellion being crushed, the work of straightening out the finances was begun. It was quickly apparent that to put the finances on a sound footing would involve re-organising the whole administration and building up practically an entirely new system of government. It almost immediately became evident that the natives were not fit to govern themselves properly according to Western standards, and thus the British, instead of withdrawing after a few months as had been the original intention, stayed on; and, after thirty-two years, they are still

there, engaged in the task of training the Egyptians to govern their country and of helping them to govern it in the meanwhile.

This task would be difficult enough under the most favourable circumstances; but, as a matter of fact, circumstances have been far from favourable. Very shortly after the occupation began the French regretted their refusal to co-operate with the British, and proceeded to avail themselves of the very anomalous and ill-defined position of the British in Egypt to obstruct them at every opportunity. This continued until 1904, when, by the Anglo-French agreement of that year, France undertook to leave Great Britain a free hand in Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco. Since then things have progressed more smoothly, but what I have described as the anomalous and ill-defined position of the British in Egypt still continues. Egypt is ruled by the Khedive, his ministers, and a council, the country being nominally under the suzerainty of Turkey. That the suzerainty is very nominal is shown by the fact that Egypt remained neutral whilst Turkey was at war with Italy in Tripoli, on the very borders of Egypt. To the Court of the Khedive are accredited diplomatic Agents of the various Powers, and theoretically these Agents are equal. In practice the British Agent occupies quite a unique position. He acts as political adviser to the Egyptian Government, his authority being derived from the fact that there is a British Army in occupation of the country. Since the occupation in 1882 there have been three British Agents in Egypt: Lord Cromer, who filled the position for twenty-four years, from 1883 to 1907, and who may be regarded as the maker of modern Egypt; the late Sir Eldon Gorst, who was not a great success;

and Lord Kitchener, who is the present occupant of the position, and dominates Egypt to-day by his personality.

The position of the British Agent has changed materially during the course of the occupation; whereas formerly a somewhat lengthy process of persuasion and diplomacy had often to be employed, now it is frequently only necessary for the Agent to express a wish that something should be done for it to be done. In some respects the British Agent is more powerful than any Indian or Colonial Governor, as the Foreign Office apparently exercises less control over him than the India or Colonial Office does over Governors. Further, his actions are less likely to be the subject of questions or criticism in Parliament, as transactions connected with the Foreign Office are not generally regarded as matters for public discussion. Thus the British Agent is given a very free hand as far as the home authorities are concerned; but in some respects he is, nevertheless, very powerless. There are certain capitulations agreed to before the occupation, to which fourteen Powers are parties. The Egyptian authorities have no jurisdiction over the citizens of these Powers. If a native of one of these countries commits an offence he must be handed over to the Consular officials of his own country. If the Egyptian authorities wish to raid a foreigner's dwelling, they must give notice to the Consul concerned. It frequently happens that the foreigner in question is warned through someone at the Consulate, and the object of the raid is defeated. To deal with civil cases in which an Egyptian and a foreigner, or in which two foreigners of different nationalities are concerned, there have been established mixed courts in which lawyers who are subjects of the various Powers signatory to the capitulations

are appointed judges. The administration of justice in Egypt is complicated and slow-working, and by no means very efficient. Yet as long as it remains under international control it is hardly possible to reform it.

In other matters great improvements have been effected in the government of Egypt. For the misrule which characterises the administration of a Turkish province an efficient administration has been substituted. In each Ministry a certain number of Englishmen and other Europeans who have entered the Egyptian service, are employed, and under their direction the different departments of State are conducted. At the instigation of the British Agent many steps have been taken to enhance the material welfare of the natives. The system of irrigation, upon which the prosperity of the country depends so entirely, has been greatly extended, the construction of the great Assouan Dam being perhaps the greatest achievement in this direction. The railway system has been extended and placed in charge of an efficient management. Various measures have been introduced with the object of benefiting the peasantry, who are the backbone of a country which is primarily agricultural. The oppression and exploitation to which they were subjected by the officials under the old *régime* have been done away with. The authorities, however, have not contented themselves with abolishing old abuses; they have taken active steps to free the peasantry from the clutches of money-lenders by establishing a bank at which loans can be obtained at a reasonable rate of interest; and more recently by passing the "Five Fedan Law," based upon the model of a Punjab enactment, which is aimed at preventing small holdings being mortgaged to and foreclosed by money-lenders.

Savings banks have been established to encourage thrift, and local cotton markets have been set up with a view to enabling the peasants to obtain the most favourable terms for their cotton. Serious efforts have been made to improve sanitary conditions and to introduce an efficient medical service. In both these matters, however, a great deal still remains to be achieved, as religious prejudice and Oriental indifference to cleanliness constitute formidable barriers to progress.

Very considerable attention has been devoted to the subject of the education of the natives, as this seems the best means of fitting them for self-government. Primary and secondary schools have been established, and also certain institutions of university rank to provide training in law, medicine, and technical subjects. The number of children at school in Egypt is still not very great in proportion to the total number of children in the country, but it is increasing steadily. The great majority of positions under the Egyptian Government are filled by natives, but it is true that these positions are the less responsible ones. Of recent years measures have been introduced to increase the share taken by the natives in the government of Egypt; provincial councils and a legislative council have been established, and a system of popular election has been adopted. Nevertheless, it is probably true that these measures represent, for the time being at least, nominal rather than real steps towards independence. They do not indicate any diminution in the power of the British Agent.

The British occupied Egypt with the avowed intention of quitting it when the country was fit for self-government. A visitor to Egypt naturally asks himself what are the prospects of the British evacuating Egypt? In

more than one respect conditions in Egypt are more favourable to self-government than in India. The country is inhabited almost entirely by people of one race and one religion, and since the reconquest of the Soudan, and its settlement as an Anglo-Egyptian dependency, it is free from any warlike race on its frontiers. On the other hand, there is no reason to think that there would not be an almost immediate reversion to the former corrupt and oppressive government if the British evacuated Egypt at the present time. The predominance of English influence in Egypt for thirty years has probably had little or no effect upon the character of the native. Though the better-educated may seek to comply externally with Western standards, at bottom they remain Orientals; they see nothing wrong in "backsheesh" or in a man in power feathering his nest when the opportunity is offered. It is true that there are many independent countries in which corrupt and oppressive Governments rule in the interests of small governing classes. The Governments of South and Central America are probably all of this class, and it may be urged that the Egyptians should be permitted to manage their own affairs in the Latin-American way if they so desire. The difficulty in permitting this appears to be that once the occupying Power has sought to administer the affairs of the country in the best interests of the people as a whole, it is under a moral obligation not to allow the bulk of the population once more to be brought under the heel of a small minority who would hold the reins of government, in the event of the evacuation of Egypt by the British. Until there is a reasonable guarantee that the Egyptians are capable of governing themselves properly according to reasonable Western

standards, they can hardly be left to their own devices, in fairness to the mass of the people.

The excellence of the results achieved by the present *régime*, and the great improvements effected in the condition of the inhabitants, are universally admitted. I met various people who had known Egypt under the old *régime*, and others who were personally acquainted with the conditions prevailing in a Turkish province to-day, and these men were very positive in their emphasis of the benefits conferred upon the country by British rule in Egypt. It must not be forgotten, however, that even better results could be achieved if the international control of judicial matters could be abolished. This could be brought about by the Egyptian Government, or the British Government on its behalf, denouncing the capitulations—much as Austria-Hungary did the Treaty of Berlin, when it incorporated Bosnia and Herzegovina in its Empire—or by the British Government declaring Egypt a British protectorate. Another possible way would be to negotiate a revision of the capitulations with the fourteen signatory Powers; but this would undoubtedly prove a very lengthy and possibly interminable process. By this time the Powers have become accustomed to the present *régime* in Egypt, and must be quite prepared for some action which would do away with arrangements which are necessary for the protection of foreigners living in a country more or less under Turkish control, but which are merely embarrassing to the present *régime* and inimical to good government. It is absurd that the consent of fourteen Powers should be necessary before an ordinance against reckless motoring can be enforced against foreigners, or before sanitary regulations can be made effective as far as citizens of foreign Powers are concerned.

To most foreigners in Egypt it is incomprehensible why Great Britain has hesitated so long to take the steps necessary to place the government of the country in a more satisfactory position in its relationship to foreign Powers. There are at least three particular occasions on which some kind of announcement was expected. One was in the early days of the occupation, at the time when it was realised that immediate evacuation was out of the question. A second was when the Anglo-French agreement was signed in 1904. A third was during the Turco-Italian war in 1911-12. The explanation of the failure of the British Government to take any action may have to do with the policy it has commonly adopted of upholding Turkey. So long as Egypt retained any connection with Turkey, however nominal, the capitulations could not be done away with. The mere act of denouncing the capitulations would amount to a declaration of independence from Turkish rule. For all practical purposes Egypt is independent of Turkey now, and the severing of the almost imaginary thread which attaches Egypt to Turkey could hardly be regarded as despoiling Turkey. To declare Egypt a British protectorate would not merely formally seal the deed by which Egypt has ceased to be Turkish, but might appear to be exceeding the terms on which Britain occupied Egypt. As, however, it would merely amount to recognising a *fait accompli*, this objection does not seem very serious. However the present extra-territoriality of foreigners in Egypt be abolished, it is quite certain that it would imply a definite British control of the country, for without some substantial guarantee of how justice was to be administered, the Powers would never consent to their citizens being

required to live **under** laws enacted and administered by a coloured and **non-Christian** people.*

If the capitulations were abolished and Great Britain were subsequently to evacuate Egypt, new capitulations would presumably have to be entered into. On account of this the abolition of the capitulations might have the effect of making the British occupation of Egypt even more enduring than it promises to be at present. Nevertheless, it does appear very desirable that extra-territoriality should be done away with in a country like Egypt, where there is a not inconsiderable number of foreigners of a somewhat nondescript and not very high-class character, who, under the cloak of foreign citizenship which they have not even always very substantial grounds for claiming, can do things contrary to the law of the land more or less with impunity.

III.

The relationship of the white races to the Chinese, who are treated as an inferior yellow race, does not redound greatly to the credit of the white races nor bear witness to the efficiency of international action. It is hardly conceivable that the white races could treat the Chinese as on an equality and let their citizens resident in China be subject to the tender mercies of Chinese law. Further, it is, generally speaking, pleasanter, owing to native sanitary conditions, and safer, owing to outbreaks from time to time of anti-foreign feeling amongst the Chinese, that Europeans should be gathered together in certain districts and administer their own affairs.

*₃ Some reference to the case of Japan is made below.

It was the Chinese who originally insisted upon segregating the white settlers in China, when these were first allowed to establish themselves in Canton. As the Chinese, generally under pressure, have permitted white people to reside in other towns of China, in each case, whether on the seaboard or inland, known as treaty ports, an area has often been set apart for their use. In some cases these areas have been definitely conceded to one or more foreign Powers by a perpetual lease, and such "concessions," as they are called, are treated as foreign territory. In other cases the areas set apart remain Chinese territory, and the title-deeds are sealed and issued by the Chinese authorities. The local administration of some of these so-called "settlements" is in the hands of the foreign residents, of others in the hands of the Chinese authorities.

Shameen, a little island in the Pearl River off Canton, is an illustration of the first type of reserved area. Two-thirds of this island—which is joined to the mainland by two bridges—are British territory, and one-third is French territory. For many years the exact status of Shameen was not very clearly defined; in any case certain Powers chose to act as if they had some say in the administration of the affairs of the island. On one occasion, to demonstrate to these Powers the mistake under which they were labouring, the British Consul-General had the flagstaff removed from the Consulate compound and set up in the street in front of the Consulate, and it is there that the Union Jack flies to this day. After a while the significance of this fact appeared to be lost upon two foreign Powers, and during the recent revolutionary troubles they proposed to land armed forces in Shameen to assist in its protection. The

Consuls of the Powers concerned were notified by the British Consul-General that any foreign sailor or soldier who was landed bearing arms would be arrested, and thus the guarding of the British portion of Shameen came to be performed by English and Indian soldiers, assisted by the local volunteers.

The "concession" system exists in two other towns I visited, viz., Hankow and Tientsin. In the former there are British, Russian, French, German, and Japanese concessions, and in the latter British, French, German, Japanese, Austro-Hungarian, Italian, Russian, and Belgian concessions. A foreign concession is ruled by the Consul of the Power concerned, but in the case of the more important concessions, and in particular of the British ones, most of the administrative functions are entrusted to Municipal Councils.

In Shanghai there are two "settlements," a French settlement and an international settlement. The latter is an amalgamation of former British and American settlements. The settlements are areas in which foreigners can hold land, leased in perpetuity by individuals from the original Chinese owners. These two settlements have complete self-governing powers; the one is governed by the French Consul and French Municipal Council, the other by the Consular body, on which the British Consul-General has only one vote out of fourteen, and by the International Municipal Council on which the British predominate; as a matter of fact, the British vote at Shanghai is strong enough to secure the return of a purely British "International Municipal Council," and it is only by courtesy that an American and two Germans appear amongst the members. Ordinarily in Shanghai the two settlements and the two councils are referred to as the English and the French.

As an illustration of an international settlement under Chinese control I may mention Hangchow, as this was the only settlement of this type which I visited. The area reserved for foreigners is at Konzenchiao, several miles outside Hangchow, and there are only some half-dozen white people living in the settlement, so that self-government is practically out of the question.

In several of the treaty ports there is no reserved area of any kind for foreigners. I believe that I am correct in saying that Nanking is a town in point. In any case, the foreign Consulates are within the walls of the native city. In some treaty ports where there are no reserved areas, but where there is nevertheless a fair number of foreigners, these have banded themselves together voluntarily and unofficially to maintain cleanliness and order in the quarters of the towns which they occupy. The foreign section of Foochow is administered in this fashion.

The only foreigners in China who are entitled to reside permanently outside the treaty ports are members of the diplomatic bodies and missionaries. The Powers on the one hand, and the Chinese authorities on the other, are not agreed as to whether a foreigner's right to live in a treaty port applies to the whole place or merely to the foreign concession or settlement where such exists. The Chinese insist upon the narrower, the Powers upon the wider interpretation of the treaties. In practice, foreigners do live outside the settlements. At Shanghai, for example, there are many foreign residences outside the settlements, and at Hankow the Japanese have built large barracks on Chinese territory, immediately behind their concession. Quite a number of foreigners who are neither missionaries nor diplomats live right away

from the treaty ports. There are two or three large foreign firms who appear to have branches all over China, the premises outside treaty ports being generally owned or leased by Chinese employees of the firms in question.

A foreigner in China, whether he lives within or immediately without a treaty port, or whether he lives right away from a treaty port, enjoys the rights of extra-territoriality. He is not subject to Chinese laws, but to the laws of his own country, administered by Consular officials.

In securing for their citizens immunity from Chinese law, and arranging in several cases for well-administered and comparatively pleasant, if somewhat overcrowded, districts in which to live, foreign Governments cannot be said to have acted unreasonably. The administration of justice in China, including the use of torture to extract evidence, and the somewhat severe system of punishments employed there, though very possibly well suited to Chinese conditions and probably much better adapted to them than European legal codes of procedure would be, are distinctly not such as most Europeans would care to be subject to. The desirability of foreign control over the foreign residential districts in China is fairly obvious to anyone who has visited a few Chinese cities. I did not see any at their worst, but the smells and the dirt in the narrow streets, and the utter disregard of the most rudimentary principles of sanitation, did not make them appear very attractive places in which to reside. In Peking many of the streets are wide, but up to a few years ago the condition of the roads was such that the only methods of locomotion available were riding on horseback, driving in a

springless "Peking mule cart," or being carried in a sedan chair. When the German Minister was killed during the Boxer troubles, he was being carried in a sedan chair. Nowadays, since the roads have been greatly improved, rickshaws, carriages, and motor-cars are commonly used, but even at the present time, owing to the awkward ruts, passengers are not infrequently thrown out of rickshaws; and during the rainy season the mud and slush are so bad that if a horse stumbles and falls in the street it is liable to be drowned. In Canton to-day there is only one road where a rickshaw can be used, namely, that along the river front. Everywhere else the streets are too narrow, and a person has either to walk or to be carried in a sedan chair. In other Chinese towns the situation often approximates to that in Canton.

But for the special provisions made for them, white people would find China very far from being an ideal country in which to live, and thus the efforts of the Powers to secure the special provisions may be justified, though it must not be forgotten that the Chinese never invited foreigners to settle in China. On the contrary, the foreigners forced themselves upon the Chinese, whose sole desire was, and probably still is, to be left alone. During the past seventy or eighty years the Powers have bullied China into doing various things, but international jealousy has prevented their being of much real help in developing China, or in increasing the material welfare of the Chinese. Foreign action in China has certainly not been initiated in the interests of the Chinese, but in the interests of the foreign Powers. The Chinese were perfectly happy in their isolation, but the Powers insisted upon the country

being thrown open to trade, so that new markets might be available for their manufacturers. Further, the Powers insisted upon missionaries being allowed to settle inland, knowing that their teaching against Buddhism and Confucianism would naturally excite anti-foreign feeling, and that the Chinese Government would probably be unable to protect them. But any outrage against missionaries, whom the Chinese never wanted and would like to be rid of, supplied an excuse for extorting indemnities or concessions; thus Germany seized Kiaochow in 1897 as reprisal for the murder of two German missionaries.

Constant attacks have been made upon the integrity of China, often with little or no excuse. France has encroached upon Chinese territory in the South, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan in the East, Russia in the North, and Great Britain in the West, if the British policy in Tibet can be described as encroaching upon Chinese territory. No sooner does one Power make a move against China than all the other Powers do likewise, for fear that the balance of power should be disturbed. Thus, after Germany had occupied Kiaochow in 1897, Russia occupied Port Arthur, which had been awarded to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 at the end of the Chinese-Japanese war, but which Japan had had to forgo on the "advice" of Russia, France and Germany. In reply to this move by Russia, Great Britain occupied Weihaiwei in 1898, compelling China to give her a lease of the desired territory, and France did the same at Kwangchowwan. Even the Italians, whose interests in China are practically nothing, tried to obtain a port at this time, but their demand was refused by the Chinese Government.

Just lately the Powers' game of land-grabbing appears to have been given up in favour of concession-hunting and loan-mongering. In these games the Powers do not act directly, but content themselves with lending their moral support to and backing up their nationals. At the present time there are numerous complaints that the British authorities are not sufficiently active in upholding British interests, and that citizens of other countries, with the assistance of their legations in Peking, are securing all the plums.

Before any opinion can be expressed upon the present action of the British authorities, or any other authorities as far as that is concerned, it is necessary to examine briefly what has happened in the matter of Chinese loans and concessions. The principal items in the foreign debt of China are £50,000,000 which represents the cost of the Japanese war in 1894-1895; £67,500,000 which was incurred in connection with the Boxer rising of 1900, chiefly for the payment of indemnities to foreign Powers; £33,000,000 incurred between 1899 and 1911 in connection with railway construction; and £25,000,000 which was borrowed in 1913 for administrative purposes. This last or quintuple loan, as it is called, is an excellent illustration of the bullying policy adopted by the Powers towards China.

On this occasion the Powers posed as the friends of China and professed to be acting in her interests, but professions of disinterestedness on the part of the Powers in their relations to China cannot be taken very seriously. Two years ago the Chinese Government wanted to borrow some money, and negotiations were entered into with a group of English banks * and a few

* Lloyds, London and South Western, Capital and Counties, and Chartered of India, Australia and China.

Stock Exchange firms for a loan of £10,000,000 on the security of the Salt Gabelle. The British authorities disapproved of the negotiations, but were not prepared to go so far as to request the British banks to desist. The real reason for the attitude of the Foreign Office is not quite obvious; it may have been the protests of certain friendly foreign Powers. No active steps, however, were taken until the Crisp loan agreement was signed and the first £5,000,000 had been issued in September, 1912. Then the Powers intervened and prevented the Chinese from paying the salt revenues into the Chartered Bank, insisting that the surplus salt revenue should be employed for paying off Boxer indemnity arrears. This was probably done merely to embarrass China and to force it to abandon the rest of the Crisp loan, and to borrow from the semi-official banks of the Powers instead.

Russia and Japan were overburdened with debt and had no money to lend, yet they insisted upon, nominally at least, participating in a loan to China, so that they might secure a share of the financial control. It was not profit which they wanted, but political power. Great Britain would have to provide the bulk of the money while securing but one-fifth of the control, to which inequitable arrangement the Foreign Office in London gave its approval. The British "Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation," the "German Asiatic Bank," the French "Bank of Indo-China," the "Russian-Asiatic Bank," and the Japanese "Yokohama Specie Bank" undertook to provide the Chinese Government with £25,000,000 on security of the Salt Gabelle, the administration of which was to be placed under foreign control, under an agreement which gives to the five-

Power group a monopoly of all future administrative loans to China. This is the famous Quintuple Loan Agreement. It is supposed to maintain the integrity of China and prevent it from being exploited by forcing that country to obtain all administrative loans through certain sources. It is absurd, however, to suppose that these particular five financial institutions are the only respectable banks of the first class capable of conducting business on a proper basis with the Chinese Government. It is only common sense that China would be likely to secure better terms if there were two or three groups of bankers with which it could negotiate for loans, than if it were obliged to resort to one particular group.

The British Government stand for "no squeeze" in connection with Chinese loans. It is a very laudable object, which they are not very successful in achieving. By helping to force China to consent to the Quintuple Loan Agreement they hoped to prevent the payment of "squeeze" in connection with administrative loans. It is commonly said that no Government business can be done in China without "squeeze," and the quintuple loan is apparently no exception. The five banks as institutions distributed no bribes, but contented themselves with paying a commission to their *compradores*, or Chinese business managers, as is always customary in China. The commission on £25,000,000 would amount to a very large sum, and the great bulk of it had probably been promised in advance by the *compradores* to various Chinese officials to smooth out difficulties which occurred in the course of negotiating the loan.

If the object of the British authorities was to put down

“squeeze” they might have achieved their object equally well, if not better, by throwing the door open to all who could comply with the stipulated conditions, and refusing to countenance a loan of any kind unless it was on satisfactory conditions. Such a policy would hardly have been so palatable to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation as the other, and their managers in London and Peking appear to be chief, if not sole, advisers on Chinese finance to the Foreign Office and to the British Legation. Nor would it have been acceptable to three of the remaining Powers—Russia, France, and Japan, who are desirous of preventing administrative loans, so as to keep China weak and thus facilitate encroachments. So far as I could judge, Great Britain and Germany have common interests in China; it is to their best interests to preserve its integrity and to maintain the open door; but, unfortunately, home and foreign politics often make Great Britain stand by France, Russia, and Japan against her own best interests in the Far East.

On a par with the Powers’ policy of preventing China from borrowing too freely for fear of its becoming too independent, is their apparent indifference as to whether such money as is borrowed is wasted or not. If another £25,000,000 were borrowed and squandered the debt charges would be considerably increased, without any corresponding increase in revenue; very likely the interest would not be forthcoming, and the Powers could then step in and insist on a *Caisse de la Dette* under foreign control.

China is undoubtedly anxious to free herself from the restrictions imposed upon her by the Powers in favour of the quintuple-group bankers, and her scheme

appears to be the establishment of a strong and independent Bank of China. The management of such a bank would be conducted partially by foreigners who were in no way connected with the quintuple-group bankers and partly by Chinese. Needless to say, the quintuple-group bankers are strongly opposed to this scheme, unless they can control the appointment of the foreigners on the staff of the proposed bank. In spite of this opposition, however, the Chinese Government is going forward with its scheme; but whether such a bank could be established, let alone successfully run, against the wishes of the quintuple-group bankers, and presumably without the goodwill, if not with the active opposition, of the five Powers behind these bankers, is more than doubtful.

The Quintuple Loan Agreement, and the opposition to the establishment of a new Chinese bank, are not the only cases of the financial bullying of China by the Powers. The indemnities claimed in respect of losses arising out of the recent revolution is another case in point. The British and the German claims are comparatively modest, whereas those of the French and Japanese are particularly outrageous. The claims of France are about five times as great as those of Great Britain, although the interests of the latter country in China are so very much greater than those of the former. One foreign firm of no great importance claims £50,000 damages in respect of profits it anticipated making, but did not realise, on goods imported just before the revolution broke out! At the annual meeting in Europe of a large foreign bank transacting business in China, the chairman congratulated the shareholders on the fact that in spite of the revolution in China the business had

suffered no set-back, yet this bank is claiming a large indemnity from China in respect of its supposed losses in the revolution! That foreigners make grossly exaggerated claims for indemnities is bad enough, but that their Governments in many cases support them in these claims is disgraceful.

It is common knowledge that the Chinese finances are not in as flourishing a condition as could be desired; the central authorities at Peking are badly in need of more money with which to carry on the work of government: The easiest way to secure more money would be to raise the maritime customs duties, which at present are at the very nominal figure of five per cent. This figure, however, is apparently fixed in perpetuity by various treaties, and can only be altered by consent of the Powers. These duties are practically finance duties, as China produces hardly any of the classes of goods which it imports. Even if they were protective duties, there could be no justification for refusing to allow them to be raised to, say, ten per cent, so that the Chinese finances could be put on a sounder basis. To this reasonable alteration the Powers are unwilling to assent, the chief opposition, it is said, coming from Japan. There are already several cotton mills in China, and the home output might be considerably increased if the duty were raised from five to ten per cent. At the present time Japan finds a remunerative market for cheap cotton goods in China, and it fears that this large market might be lost if the duties were raised. What the other Powers fear I do not know, unless it be that China would become financially less dependent on them.

Intimately connected with the question of loans is the question of concessions, as the latter very often involves

the former. Foreigners are very anxious to secure concessions to construct railways and extract minerals, not merely because it enables numerous orders for plant and materials to be placed with manufacturers at home, but because it affords the foreign countries concerned an opportunity for acquiring a sphere of influence in some section of China. To secure a concession in China, or to obtain a contract to do certain work for the Chinese Government, generally involves a good deal of direct or indirect bribery. Money may have to be paid over to individual officials, or a loan in excess of that required to finance the contract may have to be made to the Government. Very possibly both these things will have to be done.

When a foreign firm secures a contract to do certain work for the Central or a Provincial Government in China, it has frequently to arrange to lend the money to the Government with which to pay for the work. This is described as an Industrial Loan. Such a loan would provide the Government with money, merely in order to pay it all out again. The Government wishes to have some funds to meet current liabilities, and seeks therefore to secure a loan in excess of that required to pay for the work done. Such excess will be available for administrative purposes. The British authorities say they cannot sanction such transactions, as these, in their opinion, constitute a breach of the Quintuple Loan Agreement, which provides that all administrative loans shall be secured from the five banks. Unfortunately the other Powers do not appear to regard the matter in the same light, and consider their nationals are quite justified in making indirect administrative loans to the Chinese Government, and thus securing the desired contracts.

Not long ago a British firm wished to secure a contract for constructing electric tramways in Peking. It was estimated that the cost would be £600,000. The Chinese Government was agreeable, provided the firm was able to secure a loan for them of £700,000, or £100,000 in excess of the price to be paid. The Chinese Government would, of course, have been responsible for the £700,000, and the British firm would doubtless have been prepared to find the money had the British authorities been willing to give their approval. This, however, they were not willing to do, and it was rumoured when I was in Peking that the Belgians had secured the contract.

The Belgians, the French, and the Japanese are all described as being particularly pushing in the matter of securing concessions and contracts, and of interpreting the Quintuple Loan Agreement much less strictly than the British authorities. Of the Japanese it is commonly said that they borrow money in England in order to lend it in China, thereby undermining British influence in China with British money. The Japanese have been especially aggressive in the Yangtse Valley, which is supposed to be a British sphere of influence.

In view of the Quintuple Loan Agreement the attitude of the British authorities in the matter of indirect administrative loans under the guise of industrial loans is unquestionably strictly correct, but it may fairly be asked whether it is politic. What is to be gained by preventing British subjects from breaking the spirit, if not the letter, of the Quintuple Loan Agreement, if other nationals are permitted to break it at will? Nothing, as far as I can see; and, on the other hand, a good deal may be lost. Owing to the attitude of the British

authorities there must be a tendency for foreign interests and influence in China to be extended at the expense of British interests and influence.

There is one other point about the attitude of the British authorities towards concessions and contracts which deserves mention. Not infrequently the efforts to secure concessions and contracts are made, not by the representatives of large firms capable of utilising the concessions or carrying out the contracts, but by individuals of no particular standing and with little or no support behind them. They seek first to obtain preliminary agreements from the Chinese authorities, and then to find firms willing to carry out the agreements. Concession-hunters of this type the British authorities refuse to support. But it would be a mistake to think that the promotion of British interests is left entirely in the hands of this type of concession-hunter. Several large British firms have their own representatives in Peking, but it is questionable if they are always as well represented as they might be. It is not uncommon for a firm to send an ex-military man as agent to Peking. One consideration is that he will have the *entrée* at the Legation; but so will many other men, as far as that is concerned. Further, it is very possible that he qualified as language officer in Chinese during the time he was serving; but I am assured that this does not imply any great acquaintance with an exceedingly difficult language like Chinese. To send a man to Peking to look after business interests on the strength of the *entrée* at the Legation, and possibly a slight knowledge of the Chinese language, without any consideration of business capacity, hardly seems the right way to secure concessions and contracts. These retired

officers are doubtless very estimable gentlemen, but I am convinced from what I saw and learnt in Peking that they may very easily prove to be the wrong sort of men to push British trade.

The white races have come in contact with a good many backward coloured races; for example, the British in India and Egypt, the Dutch in Java and Sumatra, the Americans in the Philippines and Puerto Rico; and in each of the cases mentioned the white race appears to be acting fairly by the coloured race concerned. It is striving to govern the country in the best interests of the people as a whole, to educate the people, and to train them in the art of government. In each case the white race is trying to put down the bribery and corruption which prevail so largely amongst Orientals, but which is so inimical to good government. An Englishman, a Dutchman, or an American is justified in contemplating the work of his Government and of his countrymen in those countries, and in many other countries where they rule, with a feeling of satisfaction and even of pride; but it is difficult for a white man to contemplate the work of his Government or countrymen in China with any feeling of satisfaction, let alone pride. Finding China weak, the Powers have made the most of this weakness. The actions of Europeans in coloured countries in former days were not always very creditable, but they are at least trying to do their duty by their coloured subject-races now. In China many of the actions of the Powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are not at all creditable.

That China is backward and undeveloped, that its system of government is far from perfect and that it is

capable of benefiting by foreign assistance and experience, is obvious; but it is equally obvious that little has been done to help China. There is no lack of foreign advisers to the Chinese Government in Peking—only their advice is not taken. Something more than mere advice is wanted, but the jealousy among the Powers on the one hand, and their actions in the past on the other, make matters very difficult. No Power is prepared to trust any other Power, and the Chinese are not to be blamed if, in the light of past events, they doubt if any Power is prepared to act honestly and honourably by them. A foreign element has been introduced into the administration of certain services, and in each case the results appear to be satisfactory. In the case of the Inspectorate of Customs the foreign element was introduced some sixty years ago on the ground of "the impossibility of obtaining custom-house officials with the necessary qualifications as to probity, vigilance and knowledge of foreign languages required for the enforcement of a close observance of treaty and custom-house regulations." This was done then in the interests of the Chinese Government, but since that time foreign loans have been secured on the Maritime Customs, and had foreigners not already been associated with the administration of the Customs, the Powers would doubtless have insisted upon the introduction of foreigners, even as they did recently into the administration of the Salt Gabelle, when the salt tax was made security for the quintuple group loan.

The Imperial Post Office was organised in 1896 as a branch of the Inspectorate of Customs; consequently foreigners were associated with its administration from the outset, and this continues to be the case since its

connection with the Customs was severed in 1911 and it was placed under the Ministry of Posts and Communications. The year before that occurred the foreign staff consisted of 120, whilst the Chinese staff consisted of over 14,000. So far as I could judge, the Chinese Post Office is well run, and all foreign residents in China whose opinion I asked, spoke very well of it. One very important cause of the efficiency of the Post Office in China is undoubtedly the adoption of the principle of paying every employee a living wage, so as to remove the necessity of supplementing it by peculation. This is quite contrary to the ordinary Chinese practice; the remuneration attached to most Government posts in China is very nominal, and even this nominal remuneration is often not paid when it is due. This was the state of affairs when I was in China; the salaries of most Chinese Government employees had not been paid for months. The system can have only one result: it forces officials to obtain a "squeeze" at the expense of the general public or of the Government whenever there is an opportunity. It is obvious that no really decent government is possible as long as the system continues.

Finance is at the basis of all government. The primary object of government may be the maintenance of law and order and the protection of life and property, but these things cannot be accomplished unless adequate resources are available. It may be very essential to provide good ways of communication, to educate the people, to take steps to enhance their social and material welfare, but again the authorities can do little or nothing if there are no funds at their disposal. Before any sort of respectable or civilised government is possible, the authorities must have developed an organisation to

secure an honest and economical collection of an adequate revenue, and an equally honest and economical spending of the revenue raised. Bad finance and bad government are almost synonymous terms. An improvement in the finances renders possible an improvement in government. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the case of Egypt during the past thirty years. But for the British occupation of Egypt, however, it is very doubtful if the finances and government of Egypt would be any better to-day than they were thirty-five years ago.

An "occupation" of China by one Power prepared to act honourably and honestly by the Chinese is hardly conceivable on account of international jealousies; otherwise it should not be impossible, in spite of the great size of the country and the enormous population, as the Chinese are a peace-loving and law-abiding people, who would probably be quite contented if given satisfactory government. This is certainly the experience of the British authorities in the Straits Settlements, where there is a large Chinese population. An "occupation" would almost certainly be the most rapid method of setting the finances of China in order, of developing the country, of enhancing the material welfare of the people, and of fitting them for self-government; but as this is hardly in the realms of practical politics, the best thing probably for China is that it should make more use of foreigners in its administrative services, with the object of securing greater efficiency and freedom from corruption. The Chinese, without seeking to become completely Westernised, might follow to some extent in the footsteps of the Japanese, and utilise foreigners to assist in introducing certain Western ideas into their country. The

task would be far from easy under the most favourable circumstances; but the jealousies of the Powers, and the desire of some of them at least to check rather than encourage good and independent government in China, would render the task of the would-be reformers exceedingly difficult. Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any other way in which China could attain a state of real independence more rapidly.

IV.

The Japanese constitute the one example of a coloured race that is treated on an equal footing by the white races. It is only of quite recent years that this has been the case—since 1899, to be exact. Before that date the relationship between the white races and the Japanese was somewhat similar to the relationship between the white races and the Chinese, though the Powers have never acted in quite the same hectoring fashion towards the former as they have towards the latter. For more than two hundred years prior to 1853 the Japanese had had practically no contact with the rest of the world. In that year Commodore Perry and a United States fleet arrived in Yedo Bay, and insisted that Japanese isolation should cease. The Americans entered into a treaty with the Japanese, and shortly afterwards Great Britain and other Powers did likewise. In 1859 Yokohama, Nagasaki and Hakodate were opened as treaty ports, and settlements were established in which foreigners could reside and trade. As in China, foreigners were not subject to the laws of the country, but enjoyed the rights of extra-territoriality. In 1863 the British fleet bombarded Kagoshima in reprisal for the murder of a British

subject; and in 1865 the allied fleets of Great Britain, France, Holland, and the United States bombarded Shimonoseki as a punishment for firing on foreign ships and attempting to keep the Straits of Shimonoseki closed.

Up to this time there does not appear to have been much to choose between the treatment of the Japanese and of the Chinese by the Powers, but in the face of the danger of foreign aggression and possibly spoliation, the Japanese adopted a very different attitude from the Chinese. The Japanese decided that their only hope of dealing satisfactorily with the Western Powers was to become Westernised. The definite adoption of this policy may be dated from the resignation of the Shogun and the restoration of the Emperor to full authority in November, 1867. The fall of the Shogunate was partly due to a strong anti-foreign feeling amongst the Japanese, and to their resentment that foreigners had been allowed to gain a foothold in Japan under various treaties entered into by the Shogun. The new Government, however, did not attempt to reverse the actions of its predecessor in the matter of foreign policy. Whilst the Emperor and his Government established friendly relations with the representatives of the Powers in Japan, and began numerous reforms under the guidance of foreign experts, with the object of introducing Western civilisation into Japan, many of the people retained their intensely anti-foreign feelings, and the outrages on foreigners which had characterised the last years of the Shogunate, such as two attacks on the British Legation at Tokyo, continued after the Restoration. Thus, to mention two cases only of the many which occurred: shortly after the Restoration Japanese troops fired upon

the foreign officials and merchants present at the opening ceremony of the Kobe Settlement in February, 1868; twenty-three years later the present Czar, as Czarevitch, was attacked and seriously injured by one of the policemen set to guard the route at Otsu on Lake Biwa. By this time anti-foreign feeling in Japan was much less marked than it had been, but the attack on the Czarevitch can hardly be regarded as an isolated event. It was merely one episode of many. For example, in 1889, the British Minister and his wife had to refrain from driving in an open carriage in Tokyo for fear of a bomb or a shot; and Mrs. Fraser, the British Minister's wife, mentions in her letters that at this time stones were thrown at her in her brougham. In 1890 an attack was made by the crowd on the Russian Legation in Tokyo.

These later outbreaks of anti-foreign feeling had largely to do with the question of treaty revision. For years the Japanese authorities worked to secure the revision of the treaties which accorded rights of extra-territoriality to foreigners resident in Japan, as these rights implied that the Powers regarded and treated the Japanese as an inferior race. The foreigners in Japan, whilst very desirous of securing a modification of the clauses in the treaties which restricted their permanent residence and trading activities to the treaty ports, and which compelled them to provide themselves with special passes before they could travel in other parts of Japan, were strongly opposed to the proposal that they should be subject to Japanese law. Amongst the Japanese, on the other hand, whilst opinion appeared to be unanimous in favour of bringing foreigners under Japanese law, many feared that the throwing open of the whole of the country to foreigners for trading and residential purposes,

would lead to the bulk of Japanese trade being concentrated in the hands of foreigners. Thus treaty revision proved a lengthy and somewhat difficult problem to solve.

For years the Japanese sought, by adapting their institutions and codes to Western ideas, to secure the approval of the representatives of the Powers in Japan, and through them of their Governments, to the proposal that foreigners should be subject to Japanese law. The foreigners on the spot, officials and merchants, were opposed to the suggestion, and it was only when the negotiations were transferred from Japan to Europe, where the Foreign Offices were practically unacquainted with Japanese conditions, and where the protests of foreigners resident in Japan carried much less weight, that the Japanese succeeded in carrying their point. It was in August, 1899, that the new treaties under which foreigners became subject to Japanese law, but were freed from restrictions regarding trade and residence, came into force. Japan may then be said to have been placed on the same footing as that occupied by a minor European Power. In 1903 the Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded, and two years later, after the termination of the Russo-Japanese war, Great Britain raised its Legation at Tokyo to an Embassy, and the other Great Powers followed suit, thereby implying a general recognition of Japan as ranking amongst the Great Powers.

Forty years have seen a truly remarkable change in the relationship of the white races to the Japanese. In 1865 Great Britain, France, Holland, and the United States were bombarding Shimonoseki as a punishment for Japanese misdeeds, and at that time

and for many years afterwards Great Britain and France maintained troops in Yokohama to protect their nationals. As late as 1895, Germany, Russia, and France obliged Japan to give up Port Arthur, which had been ceded to it at the end of the Chino-Japanese war. Four years later came the abolition of extra-territoriality, and six years after that the Great Powers decided to be represented in Tokyo by Ambassadors.

The great change admitted by the Powers in the status of the Japanese, from that of persons occupying an inferior and subordinate position to that of persons recognised as citizens of a Great Power, must be attributed partly to the introduction of Western ideas and institutions on a large scale into Japan, but principally to the development of the military strength of the country. At the point of the sword the Japanese have gained not merely Formosa, Port Arthur, Korea, and a predominating influence in Manchuria, but they have secured for themselves the right to be treated as equals by the white races of the West. The bullying attitude of the Germans, Russians, and French towards the Japanese in 1895, when the three Western Powers compelled the Japanese to relinquish Port Arthur, is no longer conceivable to-day.

The fact that the Japanese are treated by the white races as citizens of a Great Power admits them to what may be called "political" equality with the white races, but this by no means implies that the white races have admitted them to what may be called "social" equality. The "political" equality is based largely on military and naval considerations; the question of "social" equality turns principally on the extent to which, and the success with which, the Japanese have become Westernised.

Reference has already been made to the introduction of Western ideas and institutions into Japan. Experts were obtained from various countries to act as advisers, but the man who must be regarded as adviser-in-chief to the Japanese throughout the earlier years of reform was undoubtedly Sir Harry Parkes, the British Minister at Tokyo from 1865 to 1883. Experts on railway, engineering, and naval matters were obtained from England, on educational and postal matters from the United States, on medical matters from Germany, and on military matters from France, and later from Germany. The old prohibition on Japanese leaving the country was removed; they were encouraged to go abroad to study Western conditions in Europe and the United States. In 1871 the prohibition against Christianity was removed, and about the same time the Gregorian calendar was adopted instead of the Chinese. Criminal and civil law and the system of legal procedure and punishments were entirely revised. The new criminal law was based on the French code; the new civil and commercial codes were modelled on the German codes. The prison system was reformed after a study of the prisons for Asiatics conducted by the British authorities in Hong Kong and Singapore. In 1871 a postal service on the European model was inaugurated. Six years later Japan entered the Postal Union, and within two years the postal agencies maintained by Great Britain, France, and the United States in Japan were closed. This occurred twenty years before the system of extra-territoriality was abolished. Just recently China, on whose efficient postal system I have commented elsewhere, has entered the Postal Union; it will be interesting to see whether

the British, French, American, Russian, German, and Japanese postal agencies in China are shortly closed as a consequence of that event. International jealousies will probably prevent this from happening, although the foreign postal agencies in China are said to be conducted at a considerable loss.

Perhaps more important than any other social reform in Japan was the introduction of a national and compulsory system of education, which dates from 1871. At the present time the compulsory school attendance ages are six to fourteen. In one respect, at least, the Japanese educational authorities have an easier task than educational authorities in the West; the desire for education amongst Japanese children and young people appears to be universal; children attend school with great regularity, and are exceedingly attentive when they are at school. In another respect, however, the Japanese educational authorities are confronted with a much more difficult task than similarly placed officials in the West; the Japanese children in their earlier years have to devote a great deal of time to learning to read and write the thousands of Chinese ideographs in which Japanese is expressed on paper; in their later years, if they pass beyond the elementary schools, they have to master a considerable knowledge of English, a language utterly different in structure and idiom from their own. In the later years of school life English is not infrequently used as the medium of instruction in studying new subjects, so that the knowledge of the language required is very much greater than that which an English schoolboy generally has of a foreign language. One of the things that struck me most forcibly in Japan was the widespread knowledge of

English amongst the Japanese; it is much easier for a traveller to manage with English in Japan than it is in British India!

The result of the language difficulties with which Japanese children have to contend is clearly seen in the educational statistics. The same statistics also show how older people are striving to improve their education. After a boy has spent six years at an elementary school he is eligible for a middle school, in which the course of study extends over five years. The age of boys admitted to the middle schools in 1910 varied from twelve years to twenty-five years and two months, the average being thirteen years and eight months. The age of boys finishing their middle school course in 1911 varied from seventeen to thirty, the average age being nineteen years. From a middle school a boy can pass to a high school, in which a three years' course of study is provided. The ages of those admitted in 1910 varied from sixteen years and nine months to thirty years and four months, the average being nineteen years and five months. After a boy has had fourteen years of schooling, six at an elementary school, five at a middle school, and three at a high school, he is eligible to enter one of the Imperial Universities. In 1910 the average age of the students admitted to the Imperial University of Tokyo was twenty-two years and nine months. The youngest of the students would be twenty years of age, the eldest probably thirty-three or thirty-four.

By means of the various reforms inaugurated under expert foreign guidance, the Japanese had become sufficiently Westernised by 1899 to convince all the Powers that the extra-territoriality enjoyed by

foreigners in Japan might safely be abolished. There were great misgivings on the part of foreigners resident in Japan, but, on the whole, their fears have not been realised. Life and property have been adequately protected. As far as criminal law is concerned, foreign offenders appear to have fared better than they would have done at home, as in some cases they have been given a hint beforehand to leave the country, and in others they have had the opportunity afforded them of departing from Japan whilst on bail during the preliminary inquiries or pending an appeal. Even if they are convicted, the sentence is very often postponed for a period. Provided the offender behaves well during that period, the sentence is not enforced. In the case of two of the three Europeans recently convicted of complicity in the naval scandals, the sentences were postponed.

In civil and commercial cases, on the other hand, it is said to be very exceptional for a white firm to win a case against a Japanese firm, so much so that most Europeans prefer to accept any sort of a compromise or even to drop their claims entirely, rather than bring a case against Japanese.

As Japan is recognised as a Great Power, the Japanese are politically on an equal footing with foreigners resident in that country, but socially there is very little intercourse between white people and Japanese. The bulk of such intercourse as there is occurs in Tokyo amongst members of the Diplomatic Body and leading Japanese officials. That the white people in Japan keep to themselves so much may be due partly to prejudice against colour, but it is to be attributed principally to the entirely different standards of life maintained

by persons of European descent on the one hand and Japanese on the other. I use the expression "standard of life" in a very wide sense as relating not merely to the material necessities, comforts, and luxuries of life, but also to the whole outlook upon life. When white people take up their residence in Japan, they do their utmost to make the life they lead there resemble as closely as possible the life to which they have been accustomed at home. The English mercantile community in a Japanese town constitutes a bit of England transplanted to the Far East. The life led has to be modified a little to adapt it to the environment : people have more servants than they do in England; they patronise the Club to a greater extent; in the seclusion of their homes they may wear a kimono and a pair of straw sandals; they will ride about in rickshaws instead of taxis, but in all essentials they live *à l'anglaise*. They read English newspapers published in Japan; they worship at an English church; they play golf and tennis; they attend race-meetings; they make week-end excursions to the seaside and to hill resorts; they commonly occupy houses which are built and furnished in European style; they may have been born and brought up in Japan, but when they speak of "home" they always refer to some place in England. This is so with every Englishman one meets in the East. Of the Dutch in Java, however, this is not so true; some of the Dutch come to regard Java as home, and Holland merely as the place from which they or their ancestors originally came.

The white missionaries in Japan probably live more *à la japonaise* than do members of the white mercantile community; but of all whites it may be said that they seek to retain their Western civilisation and to lead a

life modelled closely on their home life, although they are thousands of miles away from home, amidst an Oriental people imbued with ideas utterly different from their own. In other words, the foreign residents in Japan have no wish to become assimilated to the Japanese, and do their utmost to retain their own social institutions amidst the strange environment.

I have referred previously to the introduction of Western ideas and institutions into Japan and to the considerable measure of success which has attended the movement, a success sufficient at least to secure the consent of the Powers to their nationals being subject to Japanese law. Codes based primarily upon Roman law; a railway system which is traversed by "limited expresses" and other fast trains, with sleeping cars and with dining cars supplying European food; a good network of telegraph and telephone wires; electric tramways in the large towns; an efficient army and navy on Western models; a well-managed currency on a gold basis; a large and comprehensive educational system; the adoption of Western uniforms for all officials, from the lowest to the highest; the almost universal use of electricity for lighting purposes—these and many other indications might be quoted to show how Westernised Japan is in many respects. The Japanese as a people have undoubtedly incorporated into their life many of the outward marks of Western civilisation, but the individual Japanese still lead to a very large extent their old lives, in the essentials at least, and are certainly Oriental rather than Occidental in their outlook upon life. An Oriental does not become an Occidental merely because he now travels by train instead of being carried by coolies; because he uses the telegraph or telephone instead of

some more primitive system of communication; because he wears a coat, trousers, and boots instead of a kimono and straw sandals; or because he learns English and can read Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells in the original, instead of being restricted to Japanese and Chinese writings.

The Japanese standard of life on its material side involves living in a house of wood and paper, almost entirely devoid of furniture. The floor, covered with mats, serves both as chairs and beds. The staple articles of diet are rice and raw fish, whilst eggs and vegetables are used to some extent. It is obvious that social intercourse between Europeans and Japanese is not very feasible as long as the Japanese style of living remains what it is. A certain number of well-to-do Japanese, especially in Tokyo, live in European style, or at least have European quarters attached to their houses, and use these and serve European food when entertaining Europeans. The hotels in resorts frequented by white people and the dining-cars on express trains are commonly conducted in European style; but for this, the large foreign tourist traffic in Japan would never have developed as it has done.

In what concerns the Japanese outlook upon life, the sense of honour and the code of morality, both with regard to private life and business matters, are not those of the West. The attitude towards women differs from that of Europe or America. Japanese standards and ideas are not our standards and ideas, and the reason is largely, if not entirely, historical. "All the nations of the West have, broadly speaking, a common past, a common fund of ideas, from which everything they have and everything that they are springs naturally as part

of a correlated whole—one Roman Empire in the background, one Christian religion at the centre, one gradual emancipation, first from feudalism and next from absolutism, worked out or now in process of being worked out together, one art, one music, one kind of idiom, even though the words expressing it vary from land to land. Japan stands beyond this pale, because her past has been lived through under conditions altogether different. China is her Greece and Rome. Her language is not Aryan, as even Russia's is. Allusions familiar from one end of Christendom to the other require a whole chapter of commentary to make them at all intelligible to a Japanese student, who often has not, even then, any words corresponding to those which it is sought to translate." *

If a close comparison between Japanese and Europeans shows that the Western civilisation assimilated by the former has not affected them very profoundly, as far as their individual lives are concerned, this in no wise contradicts the fact that enormous changes have been wrought in Japan during the past forty or fifty years. The Japanese have undoubtedly succeeded in substituting many of the external marks of Western civilisation for their own Oriental civilisation, but they have not to any marked degree substituted a new style of living for the old, nor, what is more important, have they replaced the old Oriental outlook upon life by a newer Western outlook. At bottom, the Japanese remain Orientals, and the white races cannot treat them on a footing of social equality. Though this is the case, the

* Professor Basil Hall Chamberlain, Emeritus Professor in the Imperial University of Tokyo.

white races cannot but admire the success with which the Japanese have sought to reform their political, social, and legal institutions during the past half-century. It is often said that the Japanese are mere imitators, that they have originated nothing, and that they deserve no credit for what they have done. It is not the imitation, however, which one admires, but the determination and perseverance with which the imitation has been carried out. For the purpose of self-preservation the Japanese considered it necessary to become Westernised, and they have never faltered in the pursuit of their object, except where they have realised that their old institutions and civilisation could be retained without in any way affecting their aspirations to be the leading Power in the Far East. At one moment they contemplated substituting European clothes for their national dress, and giving up their art in favour of European art. Fortunately a certain revulsion of feeling against this Westernisation occurred in time to save their national dress and art, partially if not entirely. In recent years the policy of the Japanese appears to have been to adopt such portions of Western civilisation as are considered essential to further their political ideals, but otherwise to retain their Oriental civilisation.

In Japan to-day there is a peculiar mixture of Western and Eastern institutions and ideas, and the task of harmonising them is probably proving even more difficult than the original task of Westernising the country. A poor country, very heavily taxed to support political aspirations; a country in which the industrial system of Europe has been introduced without the regulations and safeguards there devised to protect the workers; a country in which, according to the Emperor's Charter

Oath, "the practice of discussion and debate shall be universally adopted and all measures shall be decided by public opinion," but in which only every seventh man has a vote, and that generally bought and sold; a country in which the Government is responsible to the Emperor and not to the Imperial Diet; a country which is at the mercy of the military and naval parties, as by certain permanent regulations of the Privy Council candidates for the Cabinet office of the Army and Navy are limited to high officers in the active service; in such a country, where the rising generation has been given a good education, has been brought into contact with all sorts of modern ideas, and has probably come to regard the rigid feudal system which survived in Japan till about fifty years ago as something which existed in the dim past, the path of the statesmen who have to guide the destinies of Japan cannot fail to be stony. I cannot summarise the situation better than by repeating the recent words of *The Times* Tokyo correspondent:—"A microcosm of the problem is presented in the student, girl or boy, who at home reads Spencer and Ibsen, Tolstoy and Bernard Shaw, Oscar Wilde and Maupassant, and at school hears his or her teacher extol the superhuman virtues of the Emperor, the sanctity of implicit obedience to parents, the doctrine that the whole duty of woman is to be a good wife and mother, and so forth." Great as the changes in Japan have been during the past four decades, it seems probable that there will be even greater—though possibly less conspicuous—changes in coming decades, before the country may be said to have reached a position of comparatively stable equilibrium.

V.

The United States of America, a predominantly white country with a very considerable black population, has a very special colour problem of its own. The American-born negroes, descendants of West African negroes brought to America to work as slaves on the plantations in the Southern States, speak English as their native tongue and regard the United States as their native country. Since the amendment of the Constitution after the termination of the Civil War in 1864, American citizenship has been conferred on the negroes. The United States has a large and steadily increasing black population within its borders, and the relationship of the white to the black population is a very vexed problem. It was the Northerners who liberated the negroes from slavery and secured for them the rights of American citizenship. In the North, where there are very few negroes, a negro suffers from no disabilities because of his colour. There is little or no social intercourse between whites and blacks, which is perhaps partly explained by the fact that most of the negroes occupy positions in the lower strata of society. A negro, however, can exercise his vote, can ride in a tram or a railway carriage beside whites, and, if he can afford to pay the fare, can travel in a Pullman car. However enthusiastic the Northerners may have been to secure the liberty of the negroes, they tolerate rather than welcome the negroes in the North, and treat them on an equality that is obviously superficial. In the Southern States the attitude of the whites towards the negroes is very different; there is no pretence of treating them on an equality. In more than one State the whites are actually outnumbered by the blacks.

In self-protection, it is claimed, the white population is forced to assert itself; negroes are not given an opportunity of exercising the political rights granted to them by the Constitution, nor are they allowed to mix with the whites on the trams or railways, but instead have to travel in cars specially allotted to them; marriage between a black and a white is a criminal offence. This is true also in a good many of the Western and Northern States.

Whatever the reason of the attitude of the whites towards the blacks in the United States, whether it is due to the alleged inferior mental calibre of the negroes or to an unwillingness on the part of the whites to treat them differently from formerly when they were still slaves, or whether it is to be accounted for merely by colour prejudice, it is quite certain that the black population of the country is not on an intellectual level with the white population at the present time, and any really equal treatment of the negroes by the whites is hardly conceivable. At the same time, it has to be recognised that the blacks in the South are treated worse than the coloured subject-races of the European Powers in the Orient. In drawing attention to this fact, however, I do not wish to suggest that the policy of the Southerners in regard to the negroes is wrong. No one who is not well acquainted with conditions in the Southern States is really justified in expressing opinions about the relationship between whites and blacks there. It is extraordinary how people's attitude toward colour problems changes after they have lived in a country where there is a very large coloured population. This may be partly accounted for by the fact that a newcomer in a coloured country accepts without questioning the conventional

attitude of the older white residents towards the coloured population, but it is largely due to the fact that he is soon forced to recognise that any contrary opinions he had formed at home were based on insufficient data. In the North one hears criticisms of the attitude of the Southerners towards the negroes; but the unanimity of the people in the South in carrying out the colour policy they have adopted—and in this matter I believe the Northerners resident in the South act just as the Southerners themselves—makes one feel that the whites in the South must have very substantial grounds for maintaining a relationship such as they have with the blacks.

VI.

If the United States has a special colour problem of its own, arising from the fact that it has both a white and a black native population, it has also another colour problem, which it shares with certain other countries, namely, the problem of the Oriental immigrant. Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as well as the United States, are faced by this problem. I shall deal with it in reference to California, as that is where I came into personal contact with it, but I believe that the situation in the other Western States, and also in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand is practically the same.

The problems raised by the immigration of Asiatics into America may be said to be partly economic, partly social, and partly political. The economic objections to Chinese and Japanese centre round the question of cheap labour. The Oriental immigrant has a very different standard of life from the white population on the Pacific

coast, a standard of life which it is very much cheaper to maintain. It is often described as a lower standard of life, but, in so far as it enables the Chinese and Japanese to support as high a level of physical efficiency as the white man, it is doubtful if this description can be correctly applied. It is quite certain, however, that the Asiatic can afford to work for a lower wage than the white man, though it by no means follows that he always does so. It is also true that he is not contented with the same remuneration that he would obtain had he remained at home.

The very lowest wage for which a Chinese or Japanese servant can be obtained on the Pacific coast is \$40 (= £8 6s. 8d.) per month, with food and quarters found, and a more common wage is \$45 (= £9 7s. 6d.) or \$50 (= £10 8s. 4d.). The wage of a reasonably good cook is \$60 (= £12 10s.) or \$70 (= £14 11s. 8d.) a month. A white woman servant will earn no more, and probably rather less, than a Chinese or Japanese "boy." As one travels further east in America servants' wages fall. In the Middle West and on the Atlantic coast a white woman servant will receive \$20 (= £4 3s. 4d.), or possibly \$24 (= £5) a month, and a man negro servant in a town like Baltimore or Philadelphia will earn about the same. An Oriental, however, can secure practically the same wages as on the Pacific coast. A bachelor in Washington, D.C., told me that he has to pay to the Japanese "boy" who looks after him and his little flat \$50 (= £10 8s. 4d.) per month, with food and quarters found. The ordinary wage of a common white labourer in America is \$2 (= 8s. 4d.) per day, which may be regarded as equivalent to \$45 or \$50 (= £9 7s. 6d. or £10 8s. 4d.) per month. Out of this

he has to provide himself with food and lodging, so that he really earns distinctly less than the Chinese or Japanese "boy."

If we compare servants' wages in the Far East with those in America, we find that Oriental servants earn enormously higher wages in America than at home. A servant in China or Japan will be paid from £1 to £1 10s. a month, with quarters found, *but no food*. A "No. 1 boy" or a cook may receive as much as £2 a month, but younger servants will earn less than £1. Perhaps nothing brings out the contrast between conditions prevailing in the Far East and the Far West better than to mention two actual cases which came to my knowledge. A lady in San Francisco told me that she paid her Chinese cook \$65 (= £13 10s. 10d.) a month, and provided him besides with board and lodging. A gentleman I stayed with in China had ten Chinese servants, whose total wages bill came to \$Mex. 125 (= £12 10s.) per month. They received free quarters in the servants' outhouse, but no food. In what concerns servants, the contention that America is in danger of being flooded with cheap Oriental labour hardly appears to be correct. As far as I could ascertain, Chinese and Japanese servants in America were anything but cheap.

One other occupation besides that of domestic service which is often followed by the Chinese in America, and with which I came into personal contact, was that of laundry-men. As far as my experience went, the charges at Chinese laundries in America were fully double those in corresponding institutions in China, but were undoubtedly lower than those made by American steam laundries, so in this case the cheap Oriental labour argument does appear to apply.

One of the industries which is most affected by the competition of Asiatic labour is farming; or, in any case, it is the one which has probably acquired the most notoriety of recent years. In this case it is Japanese, rather than Chinese, who are concerned. It is commonly stated that the Japanese settle on farms in California which white people find unremunerative. Able to live at a lower cost, and probably willing to work harder and during longer hours than the whites, the Japanese farmers are able to sell their products, not merely for as low a price as the white farmers, but actually for less. More farms become unremunerative and gradually pass from white into yellow hands, and thus the process of under-selling white farmers and acquiring their lands continues. The last step in the process was the passage of a land law by the State Legislature to make it illegal for Japanese to hold land in California. This Act has proved a great cause of friction between the American and Japanese Governments during the past two years, and up to the present no solution of the difficulty, satisfactory to the Japanese Government, has been found.

As far as the "cheap labour" argument against Oriental immigrants is concerned, it is really part and parcel of the protective policy of the country. Freely to admit Asiatic labour into the country, whilst placing heavy import duties on the cheap goods manufactured in the Far East, would be to adopt two policies to some extent at least contradictory. I say "to some extent," because they would not be entirely contradictory unless there were perfect international mobility of labour. It is very unlikely that all the manufacturers in the Far East, who produce goods suitable for the American market, would move with their labour and factories to

American soil if duties were charged on the goods but Oriental labour were admitted freely.

There is another argument, partially economic in character, which is urged against Chinese immigrants in particular. They seldom bring their womenfolk with them, as they generally appear to have no desire to settle permanently on foreign soil; their object seems to be to save enough to enable them to return to China and live in retirement. It is frequently argued that to allow the Chinese to settle temporarily in America with the object of returning to China, when they have accumulated enough means, is to permit the Chinese to exploit America purely in their own interests. To my mind, the argument is not very convincing, as the Chinese, during the period they worked in America, would undoubtedly contribute to the development of the country, and to that extent the country would have benefited, even though the Chinese did remit their earnings home. Many other people who have established themselves in trade or industry in the United States must be doing the same thing, though probably it is not so characteristic of any particular race as it is of the Chinese. In other parts of the world, especially in the Orient, the object of nearly all Europeans who settle there for trading purposes is to save and remit to Europe enough money with which to retire home; but I have never heard it suggested that such temporary residence of Europeans in the Orient was detrimental to the Eastern countries in which they settled for the time being.

There is, however, a social aspect of the temporary settlement in a country of Chinese without their womenfolk which, to my mind, is much more serious. For want of Chinese women, the Chinamen may contract

marriages with white women. When the time comes for a Chinaman who has made such a marriage to return to China, he may either desert his wife and children, or take them to China. It is difficult to say which is the worse evil of the two; very possibly the latter, as the position of a white woman living *à la chinoise* in some Chinese village would be very unenviable. The Californian Legislature has sought to protect white women by making marriage between Orientals and whites a criminal offence.

This social evil is not restricted to Chinese or to California, yet in various other countries no serious effort is made to protect white women from Chinese, or other Orientals, who may be residing temporarily in the Occident. In a country like England there are many Orientals, very possibly with wives at home, who whilst in England pass as single men. It is by no means unknown that in one way or another, perhaps by posing as princes or as persons of substantial means, they induce young English girls to marry them. The most that is likely to happen is that probably some relative or friend will warn such a girl how undesirable it is for a white girl to marry an Oriental, and try to impress upon her how utterly miserable her position will be if once she reaches the East with her husband. She very probably fails to realise how different is the status of a woman in the East from that in the West, and contracts the marriage in spite of warnings. Then at some later period she will very likely find herself and her children deserted in England, or maybe carried off to the East to some wretched existence in which she will be entirely cut off from social intercourse with white people. Legislation of the Californian type may appear to be rather

drastic to those who have never lived or travelled in the East; to those who have, however, it probably appears justifiable.

The possible evil results of intermarriage between Orientals and Occidentals is not the only social objection which can be raised to Asiatic immigrants. One such objection is that they tend to introduce certain diseases from the evil effects of which they themselves are now largely immune and which no medical examination, however thorough, at the port of entry, can reveal. White people frequently prove to be very susceptible to the germs when once the germs enter their systems, and suffer acutely from the illnesses. I was told by a medical man that white fishermen were contracting diseases which, there was every reason to believe, had been caught from Japanese fishermen in Californian waters. Another social objection to Asiatics is that in the mixed schools the attitude of Oriental boys towards white girls is said not always to be as correct as it should be. This is probably one reason why in California there is such a strong feeling in favour of segregating Oriental children in special schools.

A very serious objection to Oriental immigrants which is partly social and partly political, has to do with the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of assimilating Asiatics. The American people is made up of a conglomeration of elements coming from practically every country of Europe. At first the Anglo-Saxon element greatly predominated. Then great numbers of Germans, and also Swedes and Norwegians in considerable numbers, settled in the United States. In most cases it was young, energetic, enterprising people who came to America, a very desirable class of immigrants,

who very quickly became Americanised. Later waves of immigration brought hordes of people of the Latin, Greek, and Slavonic races, whose languages and institutions were often very different from those of America. Moreover, they could frequently by no means be reckoned amongst the most enterprising and energetic of their countrymen. They were often distinctly inferior material.

How far America will be successful in absorbing these vast numbers of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe still remains to be seen. The task is an enormous one, and it is realised that it is almost hopeless to look forward to Americanising such immigrants of this type as were adults when they first landed on American soil. Many of them after years of residence know no language other than their native tongue, and their institutions, ideas, and standards of life remain practically unaffected by residence in the United States. Where child immigrants are concerned, and, above all, in the case of children born to immigrants after they have settled in America, the task is different. The common school is the great Americanising factor. It is not merely that the children of immigrants learn English there, and by being brought into contact with children who are already Americanised thereby acquire American habits and ideas by a process of imitation, but that the American Constitution is taught as a subject in the schools, and flag drills are regularly held so as to inculcate patriotism into the children. In schools where immigrant children are few and American children many, the process of assimilating the few should be comparatively easy; but in schools where immigrant children greatly predominate, the Americanisation of

the immigrants must be very imperfect, especially if their parents in their homes have remained absolutely alien in their language, style of life, and thought.

At the present time there is in America a very considerable white population which has not been assimilated. One hears of certain classes of work being done by Greeks, others by Italians, and so forth. At a big copper mine near Salt Lake City I passed a whole town of very small wooden huts, in which, I was informed, the Greek labourers who worked at the mine lived. It is more than doubtful whether these labourers' children, some of whom were playing about stark naked in pools of exceedingly dirty water, will become well Americanised as the result of going to a school in which they will probably be the only pupils.

In New York I was struck by the prevalence of a strong anti-Jewish feeling. In New York City there are said to be more than a million Jews, who have come from all parts of Europe, and they are looked upon with anything but favour by the ordinary white citizen of that town. I was told that when Jews begin settling in any district of New York, the value of property in such district immediately falls, as other people no longer wish to live there and take the first opportunity of moving away. This is the same sort of phenomenon that occurs in the United States when negroes descend upon any district. This anti-Jewish feeling was by no means restricted to the matter of residence. Educational institutions in which there are a considerable number of Jews are places to be avoided as far as possible by children of Christians.

The existence in the United States of various large distinct foreign communities, Greek, Italian, Jewish, and

so forth, which up to the present have not been assimilated, constitutes a danger to American civilisation. If this type of immigrant is pouring into the country at a more rapid rate than the existing social organism is capable of absorbing it, the necessity will probably arise for a more rigorous exclusion of this class of immigrant, who at best is not very desirable, until those who have already settled in the country have been properly assimilated. It should certainly not be impossible in the course of one or two generations to assimilate Greeks, Italians, Russians, Hungarians, and so forth, if serious efforts are made; but should the anti-Jewish feeling continue, and, above all, should it become more marked than it is at present, it is quite possible that there will be a Jewish problem in the United States, just as there is a negro problem.

It is necessary to understand something of the general immigration problem in the United States to appreciate the strong objection that is felt to Asiatic immigrants. If it is difficult to assimilate the recent waves of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, how much more difficult is it, if not impossible, to assimilate Orientals. In writing about Japan I have referred to the barriers which make social intercourse on an equality between whites and Japanese in Japan practically impossible. In many external matters the Japanese have become Westernised, but their way of living, many of their institutions, and their mode of thought, remain thoroughly Oriental. Other races in the Orient are even less Westernised than the Japanese. Opinion in America is almost unanimous that Asiatic immigrants who have settled there and their descendants do not become Americanised. They remain Chinese and Japanese,

just as much as the European residents in China and Japan remain Europeans. I met English people in Japan who had been born and brought up there—one, in fact, who had actually been educated at Japanese schools, a very unusual occurrence. These people can talk Japanese fluently, can live *à la japonaise* without feeling any of the discomforts which a new arrival from Europe experiences when asked to squat and sleep on the floor, eat Japanese food, and so forth. In spite of their knowledge of Japanese and intimate acquaintance with Japanese customs and manners, these people were thoroughly English, and the same undoubtedly holds good of Chinese and Japanese settlers in America; they are thoroughly Chinese and Japanese in spite of a good knowledge of English and some adoption of an American style of living. Even if they desired to become thoroughly Westernised, it is very doubtful how far they or their children or grandchildren would succeed, but it is very probable that they have no more wish to become Occidentals than European settlers in the East have to become Orientals. The Chinese and the Japanese in America constitute separate communities, of which "Chinatown" in San Francisco is the most substantial embodiment. There thousands of Chinese are congregated together and have set up what is practically a Chinese city on American soil. Since it has been rebuilt after the great fire of 1904, it is said to be less Chinese in appearance than previously, but the fire can hardly have affected the spirit that predominates in that section of San Francisco. It remains as Oriental as ever.

The other Oriental communities in America are much smaller than the Chinese community in San Francisco, but there is no reason to think that they are any less

Oriental. Even a Japanese family wearing European clothes and living in a farm building erected in American style, isolated amongst a white population, will probably remain as Japanese in spirit as some European missionary, wearing Chinese costume and living in a Chinese house in the interior of China, hundreds of miles from the nearest white man, will remain European in spirit. The fundamental differences between Orientals and Occidentals are not obliterated by the residence of an Oriental in the West or of an Occidental in the East. The settler may speak the language and adopt the clothing and even the style of living of the country in which he settles, but he still retains his racial characteristics. He does not become truly assimilated to the people of the country of his adoption. For this reason, then, the Americans object to Asiatic immigrants. The settlement on the Pacific coast of large Asiatic communities which cannot be assimilated would be both a social and a political danger—social, because it would be detrimental to the development of American civilisation; political, because in the event of war with an Oriental country the presence of a large and compact body of aliens of a warlike race in their midst, might easily prove very troublesome, to say the least of it.

The feeling, for one reason or another, against Oriental immigration into the United States has been sufficiently strong to lead to very serious restrictions being imposed upon it. Asiatic immigrants of the artisan class are no longer admitted. In 1882 Chinese immigration was forbidden for ten years, and in 1888 the exclusion was made permanent. In the case of the Japanese who began to migrate to America in large numbers after the Russo-Japanese war, this exclusion has been

brought about by a "gentleman's agreement" between the American and Japanese Governments, the Japanese preferring voluntarily to restrain their citizens from going to the United States rather than see a law passed to prevent Japanese from landing in America. It must be very galling for a country with the political aspirations of Japan—a country, too, which has secured recognition as a Great Power—to see its nationals rejected as undesirables in different parts of the world. It is a constant reminder of the fact that white races are not prepared to treat Orientals as equals.

The restrictions on Asiatic immigrants do not apply to students, and every year a certain number of young Orientals arrive in America to carry on their studies. The institutions generally selected are the University of California at Berkeley, Cal., and Leland Stanford University at Palo Alto, Cal., as these Universities are most accessible to Trans-Pacific students. In past years the Japanese students have commonly worked their way through the Universities by doing domestic work in their spare time. Since the Russo-Japanese war, however, many of the Japanese students have been unwilling to earn money by doing domestic work, holding, apparently, that it is undignified to act as cooks or house "boys." To an Englishman this attitude may not be incomprehensible, but it certainly does not meet with approval amongst Americans. Their Universities are far more democratic institutions than ours, and it is quite common for white students to work their way through a University. Many white students earn money on their board and lodging by waiting at table and washing up the crockery during term time at clubs, boarding houses, and private houses. Their social standing is in no way

affected by doing this. I was told of students who waited at six-o'clock dinner on the girls residing in a women's "fraternity house," then went home and put on evening dress and returned to the same "fraternity house" at eight o'clock to participate in a dance, at which they would doubtless dance with the girls on whom they had previously waited. If white students do not consider it undignified to perform domestic work, and do not suffer loss of social prestige thereby, there is no reason to think that Japanese students in America would suffer in any way by doing the same thing.

VII.

In the case of predominantly coloured countries it may seem so obvious that the attitude of the authorities towards coloured immigrants should be one of *laissez faire* as to call for no comment. As a matter of fact, though there are some Governments which adopt this attitude, for example, those of Hong Kong and Japan, there are others which are quite paternal in their solicitude for coloured immigrants, and again others who adopt a restrictive attitude similar to that of the Governments of certain white countries.

Ceylon is an excellent illustration of a coloured country in which coloured immigrants, or at any rate certain classes of coloured immigrants, are especially cared for by the Government. The native Singhalese are, generally speaking, not very keen about working on the rubber and tea plantations, and a large amount of Tamil labour is brought over from Southern India to supplement the Singhalese labour. When Tamils are recruited in India their debts have to be paid before they

can leave their villages. They come over in small gangs with wives, families, and other dependants, under a leader; and all money advanced to the gangs to pay off debts and so forth has to be paid by the estate on which they first take up work in Ceylon. These debts can gradually be recovered by deductions from wages, but it is laid down by law that the deduction may not exceed one-half of the wage which remains after rice has been purchased. A common arrangement is to make the maximum deduction allowed in alternate months, so that in reality the estates only recover the debts owed by their coolies half as rapidly as they might do. Whilst the coolies remain on an estate, it frequently happens that new advances are made to them on the occasion of weddings and other festivals, so that in the course of time the debts tend to grow rather than diminish. When a gang of coolies passes from one estate to another, the new estate is supposed to take over the coolies' debts, refunding to the old estate the sums due to it from the coolies. This is merely by mutual arrangement amongst the planters; if a coolie leaves an estate the planter has no legal claim against the coolie for money owing. In this matter the law appears to be exceedingly favourable to the Tamil coolies. The only thing that prevents them from leaving an estate and repudiating their debts is that most planters will not engage coolies from another estate except by mutual arrangement with the manager of that estate.

When a planter engages Tamil coolies he has to provide them with quarters free, and also supply them with a certain quantity of rice each week. At the end of the month when the wages are paid the value of the rice supplied is deducted from the wages. For this

purpose the value of the rice is taken at cost price, or less.

Tamil labour is welcomed in Ceylon, and special provision is made by the Government for its welfare. The position is somewhat similar with regard to Tamil labour in the Straits Settlements. In that country a certain amount of Javanese, and a great deal of Chinese, labour is also employed. No restrictions appear to be imposed on coloured immigrants. The great majority of the population of Singapore is Chinese, and the same is probably true of Penang. The Chinese prove themselves to be peaceable and industrious citizens; a great deal of trade is in their hands, and not a few estates belong to them. As coolies on plantations they work harder than Javanese or Tamils, and in consequence earn considerably higher wages. Many Chinese appear to be permanently settled in the Straits Settlements with their womenfolk, and there is quite a large number of Straits-born Chinese.

Another country which has welcomed Chinese, and would gladly welcome more, is British North Borneo, where the supply of labour is quite inadequate for the development of the country. At the present time the Borneo Company is engaged in negotiations to settle a considerable number of Chinese families in Borneo; so that it is quite obvious that the Government desires a permanent Chinese population, if such can be secured.

Of the predominantly coloured countries which have adopted a restrictive attitude towards coloured immigrants I may mention three: Java, Hawaii, and the Philippines. This last country I did not visit, but I am referring to it, nevertheless, as I had various oppor-

tunities whilst crossing the Pacific of discussing some of the problems of those islands with American officials who were returning from the Philippines to the United States.

In Java it is the Chinese who have aroused the hostility of the Dutch authorities, and whose immigration is restricted as far as possible. The reason for this appears to be that the Chinese settlers have been too successful to please the Government. The Chinese, with the thrift and capacity for business which so strongly characterise them, have gradually got into their hands a very large proportion of the trade of the island; a great many of the shopkeepers and not a few wholesale dealers are Chinese, and the natives of the island appear quite unable to hold their own against them. This is doubtless due very largely to the fact that they lack the qualities which go to make successful traders and business men, but it is also due partly to some apparently ill-conceived paternal legislation on the part of the Government. To protect natives from exploitation, the authorities have enacted that debts cannot be recovered from natives by legal process. As a consequence European firms established in Java are unwilling to sell goods to natives on credit; to the Chinese, on the other hand, they are perfectly willing to give credit, as good-class Chinese traders can be absolutely relied upon to pay their debts in due course. A Chinese dealer may take the risk of according a limited amount of credit to a native shopkeeper, or he may let him have goods on consignment, a more cumbersome but distinctly safer process.

The cause of the legislation protecting native debtors from their creditors is probably to be found in another

sphere of Chinese activity, namely, money-lending to small farmers. The native landowners who borrowed money from the Chinese were frequently unable to repay it, and bit by bit more and more of the crops and agricultural land fell into the hands of the Chinese. At the present time, a very considerable proportion of the rice and sugar crops is said to be controlled by the Chinese. This, even more than their great hold on the wholesale and retail trade of the island, tends to make the Chinese unpopular. Of recent years there has been a good deal of agitation against the Chinese in Java, which has been conducted nominally on religious grounds. The natives cannot be described as strict Mohammedans, but they regard the Arabs, who have been at the back of the movement, with great respect as being good Mohammedans. The Arabs have made use of their influence to stir up anti-Chinese feeling, so as to get rid of their chief competitors in trade and money-lending. Amongst Europeans in Java opinion appears to be unanimous that the Arabs treat the natives much worse in trading and money-lending transactions than the Chinese; so that the natives would be almost sure to lose and not gain if the Arabs, by working upon the Mohammedan prejudices of the natives, succeeded in supplanting the Chinese.

It is generally believed that the Dutch would like to restrict the activities of the Japanese in Java as much as they would those of the Chinese, though up to the present the Japanese in Java are not nearly so numerous or influential as the Chinese. They have not ventured, however, to impose the same restrictions on the Japanese as on the Chinese, fearing apparently that Japan would not brook a minor Power placing on its citizens dis-

abilities from which citizens of European Powers were exempted.

In the Philippines it is much the same story as in Java; the Chinese and the Japanese are much more industrious and thrifty than the natives, and have secured a strong hold on the trade and agriculture of the islands. Their immigration is now prohibited unless they can prove they are close relatives of Chinese and Japanese already settled in the islands. Certain American lawyers are said to make handsome profits out of assisting would-be immigrants to prove that they possess the necessary relationship to existing settlers. I was told that for \$500 (£105) practically any Chinaman could be proved to be the son of some settler or other!

In Hawaii, where Oriental immigration is now also restricted, there is a very large Japanese community which is regarded with considerable mistrust by the American authorities. In the case of the Japanese, both in Hawaii and the Philippines, it is not so much the hold on trade and agriculture which they may secure that is feared, but the fact that Japan is supposed to look with covetous eyes upon those islands. How much truth there is in this it is impossible to say. What appears to be certain is that Japan has such a very large population in proportion to her available resources that it would not be unnatural if she should seek new fields in which her surplus population could settle under the Japanese flag. First Formosa and later Korea have been incorporated in the Japanese Empire, but it is quite conceivable that Japan might be willing to enlarge its territory again if it could secure land where there was plenty of scope for agricultural development. The Philippines, which are close at hand, and on which Japanese settlers have

prospered in the past, undoubtedly possess great attractions for the Japanese. The fact that the Filipinos appear to be none too capable of governing themselves, and that they are neither so industrious nor so numerous as not to leave plenty of scope for the Japanese, should make the Philippines appear all the more attractive to Japan. I cannot think that Hawaii, on the other hand, with its small area and great distance from Japan, can be strongly coveted by the Japanese, unless it be for naval purposes. However that may be, now that Hawaii is a "Territory" of the American Union it is only natural that the same policy towards Oriental immigrants should be adopted there as on the mainland, although local conditions may be very different.

The relationship of the United States to the Philippines is somewhat ambiguous—the islands are neither part of the Union nor an American colony. They are merely "occupied" by the Americans, who claim that they will hand the islands back to the Filipinos when these are fit to govern themselves. In the meanwhile the Powers treat the Philippine Islands as if they were American, as it is obvious that they are not independent, and that the United States are responsible for the government of the islands. The United States, on the other hand, refuse to treat the Filipinos as American citizens, as I saw for myself when some of them were desirous of landing in San Francisco from the boat on which I had crossed the Pacific. Whatever the exact status of the Filipinos may be, it is certain that the internal and external policy of the islands is directed by the United States. Part of this external policy is to prevent more Japanese from settling in the islands, as it is clear that, should Japan seek to take over the

Philippine Islands, the larger the Japanese community in the islands the easier the task of the Japanese Government would be. The belief amongst Americans that Japan covets the Philippine Islands is almost universal; whether the belief is justified there is no conclusive means of showing. The belief, however, is undoubtedly a very important factor in determining the relationship between a great white race, both at home and in the predominantly coloured country which it governs, and a great yellow race.

VIII.

The term half-caste is used to denote a person of mixed parentage, or, more vaguely, one whose ancestry is partly of one colour and partly of another. When the word is used without any explanation, it implies that the individual referred to has a certain amount of white blood in his veins, though there is no reason why the offspring of a pure-blooded Chinese and a pure-blooded Filipino, for example, should not be described as a half-caste. In several countries, instead of using the general term "half-caste," people make use of some special word which indicates more accurately the parentage of the individual referred to. In India the common expression is "Eurasian," which indicates a person of mixed European and Asiatic parentage; generally, such a person has a white father and a native mother. The word "Eurasian" is one to which some opprobrium is supposed to be attached, and recently in official documents the term "Anglo-Indian" has been substituted for it. To say the least of it, this is very confusing, as

the term "Anglo-Indian" has been used in the past, both officially and in general parlance, to denote a member of the English community in India, and is still so used. A change in name will certainly not alter the attitude of the general public towards half-castes. If public opinion disapproves of half-castes, it will do so whether they are described as Eurasians or as Anglo-Indians. Any opprobrium which may have attached to the term "Eurasian" will sooner or later attach to the term "Anglo-Indian," if that expression comes to be generally accepted as denoting a half-caste.

A particular type of half-caste in India is described as a Goanese. Strictly this indicates a native of Goa, the little Portuguese colony on the west coast of India. In practice, it is always assumed that all natives of Goa have some Portuguese blood in their veins, so that all Goanese are regarded as half-castes, though ordinarily they are not described as Eurasians, perhaps because their European ancestry is somewhat remote.

In the Philippines the expression "Mestizo" is used to denote the descendants of Spanish and Filipino marriages. In South America the same term is used to indicate the descendants of Spanish and American-Indian marriages. In Latin America there are also two other expressions in common use: "mulatto," to denote the offspring of Europeans and negroes, and "quadroon," to denote the offspring of white and mulatto.

There are two diametrically opposed attitudes towards half-castes which white people may adopt. Some white people strongly disapprove of mixed marriages, and look down upon the offspring of such marriages and relegate them to a very inferior social position. Other white people seem to see no drawbacks to mixed marriages,

and treat the children of a white father and a coloured mother as if they were pure white. The former attitude is characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon race, both in British territory overseas and in the United States; the latter attitude is characteristic of the Dutch in Java, and also of the Spanish and Portuguese in Latin America.

The position of Eurasians in India is certainly not enviable. White people refuse to have any social intercourse with them, and the natives, taking their cue from the whites, also look down upon them. The Eurasians, on the other hand, consider themselves superior to the natives, and wish to live as Europeans. As a consequence they form a community by themselves, living very frequently under wretched conditions, with little or no education; their earning capacity is no greater than that of natives. A wage which is adequate to support a native in comfort according to his standard of life is quite insufficient to support a Eurasian in European style, and thus their economic situation is often one of much misery. The post office and the railways provide a very fair amount of employment for Eurasians, but the salaries they can earn are hardly such as will enable them to live up to their aspirations.

What exactly is at the bottom of the English attitude towards Eurasians it is not easy to say. It is commonly held that they inherit all the vices and none of the virtues of the two races from which they spring. Whether this really is so, or whether their deficiencies, such as they are, are due to want of education and to undesirable environment, it seems difficult to say. In any case, white opinion in India is practically unanimous in regarding Eurasians as lacking in moral qualities. Another cause of the English attitude towards Eurasians

may be the impression that to adopt any other attitude, and in any way to encourage Eurasians, would be subversive to British prestige.

In their relationship to Eurasians the missionaries are in a somewhat different position to those Englishmen who belong to the official and commercial communities. The missionaries as a whole probably sympathise with the Eurasians rather more than other Englishmen and do a little more to help them. There are some missionaries who go as far as to approve of mixed marriages, and even consider it the duty of missionaries to marry native women in order to secure more influence with the natives, and convince them that they are prepared to treat them as equals. I was told of one young Oxford man who had recently married the daughter of a native clergyman, but the missionaries who mentioned the case were rather dubious about it and seemed to regard it as ill-advised. My impression was that the missionaries who advocate mixed marriages are very much the exception.

The general attitude of missionaries towards Eurasians I should describe as one of sympathetic neutrality. The missionaries realise how miserable is the position of many of the Eurasians, and in one or two cases they have established schools in which a very limited number of Eurasian children receive an elementary education. With few exceptions, however, they devote their efforts almost exclusively to the natives, presumably because the funds subscribed at home are earmarked for the education and conversion, when possible, of Hindus and Mohammedans; the home supporters of missions apparently hold that the Eurasians, who are at least nominally Christians in

many cases, do not require assistance. During my travels I visited various secondary schools and colleges conducted by missions of different denominations, and I was much struck by the efforts being made to educate young Hindus. Most of the pupils and students belonged to the higher castes, especially to the Brahmin caste. I was informed that these Brahmin youths generally win the Scripture prizes, but practically never became converts to Christianity. To anyone who is unacquainted with the whys and wherefores of missionary policy, the sight of missionary funds being lavished on educating natives with no real prospect of converting them, whilst youths who are of partially white descent and not supposed to be heathen are largely, if not entirely, neglected, is somewhat incomprehensible. To the outsider, the Eurasian youth appears to stand in more need of education than the Brahmin youth, and to be more deserving of the gifts of the charitable.

In referring to the negro problem in the United States it was mentioned that intermarriage between whites and blacks is in many States a criminal offence. Nevertheless, there are a good many so-called negroes whose ancestry is partially white. These half-castes do not constitute a class by themselves as in India, but are treated as forming part of the negro community. It has already been stated that the general level of mental capacity amongst the negroes is low; when any "negro" shows unusual mental capacity it is commonly held to be a sure indication that he has some white blood in his veins, though whether this really is so in any particular case it is often impossible to establish beyond doubt. Of certain leaders amongst the negroes it is often disputed whether or not they are pure-blooded

blacks, the negro community maintaining that they are, and the white community that they are not. The dispute may have some bearing on the general negro problem as raising the question of the possibility of pure-blooded negroes attaining considerable intellectual development, but it does not affect the attitude of white American citizens towards half-castes: the relationship between whites and the offspring of mixed marriages and their descendants, is exactly the same as that between whites and negroes.

Coming direct from India and Ceylon I was particularly struck by the attitude of the Dutch towards half-castes in Java. There the tawny offspring of Dutch fathers and Javanese mothers are treated as whites. Mixed marriages are not discouraged, and every Dutch soldier in the colonial service appears to have a Javanese concubine if not a wife. The barracks are described as great nurseries! I visited the chief secondary school in Batavia and found the pupils to be boys and girls of every shade of colour from white to brown—pure-blooded Dutch, Chinese and Javanese, and the offspring of Dutch and Javanese, and of Chinese and Javanese marriages, sitting side by side in the same class room. It does not appear to have been the original intention of the authorities that the pupils at this school should be quite so variegated; no colour bar was established, but the school was erected some way out of Batavia, and the requirement was laid down that every child on entering the school should have an adequate knowledge of Dutch. This, it was thought, would restrict the school to better-class Dutch and Dutch half-castes whose parents would be in a position to have their children driven to and from school. The opening of a steam tram from the town past the

school, and the increasing facilities for well-to-do coloured people to have their children instructed in Dutch, has rendered the school a great deal more accessible than was originally intended; which, I gathered, is not at all to the liking of many Dutch parents.

It is not merely the Dutch in the lower scales of society who marry Javanese women; quite a number of Dutchmen in good positions have Javanese wives. This was probably more common formerly, when Dutch settlers remained out many years before returning to Europe on leave, than it is to-day, now that the years of service before home leave can be obtained have been reduced. But even to-day the Dutch in Java visit Holland at less frequent intervals than do the English in India visit England, and this tends to encourage mixed marriages. Once a Dutchman has contracted such a marriage the ties which hold him to Java are strengthened, whilst those which hold him to Holland are correspondingly weakened. Java tends to become his permanent home, and the desire to return to Holland, even on a visit, is considerably diminished. Thus, owing to intermarriages there are numerous permanent Dutch settlers in Java. Their children may go to Holland for a few years to obtain a university education which they cannot secure in Java, but these half-castes look upon Java, and not Holland, as their home. It is commonly said that these half-castes are one cause of the growing unrest in Java, as they feel that could they but get rid of the Dutch the government would fall into their hands, and not those of the Javanese, whose superiors they undoubtedly are in the matter of education. The position in the Philippines is said to be very similiar—

it is the mestizos, the descendants of Spanish-Filipino marriages, who agitate so strongly for the immediate withdrawal of the Americans, as they feel that, in such a case, they would have even more opportunities of exploiting the Filipinos than they had in the old days under the Spanish *régime*.

It would be a mistake to suppose that all the offspring of mixed marriages remain in Java. In some cases the fathers decide to return to Holland when their service in the Indies has finished. The children are taken over and settled in Europe. In due course many of them marry there, and a strain of Javanese blood must be widely diffused in Holland. One Englishman I met in Java expressed the opinion that practically every Dutchman and Dutchwoman was "touched with a tar-brush," and that for an Englishman to marry a Dutchwoman was a very risky experiment, as a child of the marriage might closely resemble some dusky ancestor. The Englishman doubtlessly exaggerated the extent to which Javanese blood has permeated the Dutch people, but the sentiments to which he gave expression, even if rather crude, were characteristic of the English attitude towards mixed marriages.

In Holland the fact that a man has some coloured ancestors appears to constitute no bar to his progress; one of the most recent Governor-Generals of the Dutch Indies was a half-caste! To English people the idea of a Eurasian being appointed Viceroy to preside over the destinies of British India must be almost inconceivable; that the corresponding position in the Dutch Indies has actually been filled by a half-caste, clearly emphasises how utterly different is the Anglo-Saxon from the Dutch attitude towards

persons whose ancestry is partly of one colour and partly of another. The Dutch are not alone in their attitude; the Spanish and Portuguese undoubtedly share it. Possibly race-prejudice is greater amongst the Anglo-Saxons than amongst the Dutch; possibly instincts of race-preservation are more strongly developed amongst the former than amongst the latter; possibly economic circumstances have played an important part; but whatever the reasons may be, there can be no doubt that the Anglo-Saxon and the Dutch attitudes towards half-castes are diametrically opposed. It is difficult to say which attitude is morally the more correct, though there is some reason for thinking that politically the Anglo-Saxon attitude is sounder.

IX.

In the limited space at my disposal my treatment of coloured problems is necessarily very inadequate; many points which are barely touched upon are deserving of much greater elaboration. The importance of colour problems cannot easily be exaggerated; the relation of the Colonial Powers to their subject-races, and the attitude of the white races to the Chinese and the Japanese, both in the Far East and in those white countries whose shores are washed by the Pacific Ocean, raise questions of world-wide interest. A very considerable change in the situation has been wrought by the Russo-Japanese war. Of the full effects of the war it is impossible to judge at present. The Japanese have doubtless been greatly influenced by their success, though the sense of elation which followed their great military and naval victories has now considerably sub-

sided. The enormous financial burden involved on a naturally poor country discharging heavy liabilities incurred during the war, and trying to live up to the standard of a Great Power, cannot have failed to have a depressing effect on the Japanese expansion movement. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Japanese are a good deal more aggressive to-day, both in the spheres of commerce and politics, than they were before the war.

The Japanese, however, were not the only coloured people affected by the result of the war. In China the movement in favour of Westernisation has received a considerable impulse, but it does not appear to have made much real headway. China is a continent in itself, with numerous countries, populated by various peoples, speaking different languages and animated by unlike ideals within its borders. The hold of the central authorities in Peking over the whole country is comparatively weak, and these authorities are not in a position to impose their will on the whole population, as the Imperial Government at Tokyo is in the case of Japan. A rapid evolution of China comparable to that of Japan is almost inconceivable. The Chinese appear to be largely lacking in the martial ardour which characterises the Japanese and which makes a military despotism possible.

If the Russo-Japanese war has had no serious consequences for the Western Powers as far as China is concerned, the position is very different in some of the colonial dependencies of these Powers. It is certain that in consequence of the war the prestige of the white races has been considerably shaken in the eyes of all coloured races, and that the spirit of unrest amongst the subject coloured populations has increased. The Japanese have

shown them that a coloured race can, not merely oppose a white race, but oppose it successfully, and they do not see why they should not do likewise. The position of the dependent coloured races is quite different from that of the Japanese; but that very likely they do not realise.

In this country colour problems do not appear to receive the attention they deserve. From time to time some phase of the colour question comes into the limelight, and the general public is aroused by the attempted assassination of a British official in India, or by the treatment of Indians in South Africa, or by a speech of a British General in New Zealand on the danger arising from the immigration of rice-eating people, or by the refusal to allow certain Hindus to land in British Columbia and the subsequent hunger-strike of the would-be immigrants, or by the lynching of a negro in the Southern States, or by the rumours of a rupture between the United States and Japan in connection with the anti-Japanese legislation in California. Each case as it occurs is treated as an isolated problem; no attempt is made to understand the relationship it bears to other colour problems; after a few days the newspapers cease to report the case any more, and then all interest in it dies down.

The reader may, not unreasonably, ask what conclusions I draw as a result of my brief survey of some aspects of the colour question. My answer may seem unsatisfactory, but I am afraid it is the only one which I can give: the various colour problems are not merely unsolved at the present time, but appear to be insoluble. For the moment a sort of *modus vivendi* may exist, but the frequent outbreaks of friction between the various races concerned show that it is far from meeting with

universal approval, and that its duration is likely to be limited. The old idea was that a final settlement of the colour question could be found in a permanent dominance of the white over the coloured races. This idea received its first set-back when the negroes in the United States were granted equal political rights with the white population by the amendment of the Constitution after the Civil War. It received a second and much more serious set-back when the Japanese secured recognition as a Minor Power in 1899, and as a Great Power in 1905 after their successful war with Russia. Once the process of modifying the *modus vivendi* has begun, it is impossible to foresee at what point it is going to stop; sooner or later the clash of colour and racial interests may easily prove to be a dominant factor in the world's history.

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